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I. INTRODUCTION
"What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,
What laws, what barb'rous customs of the place
Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,
And drive us to the cruel seas again?"' - Virgil
Much has changed since Virgil's prose evaluated the intersection
of two ancient codes of law: the law of hospitality and the law of the
sea. 2 The juncture, however, of the laws that regulate the interaction
of humans and those of the sea is not a recent development. The law
of the sea has evolved in accordance with the demands humans have
placed on it, and never before have humans demanded more from the
oceans, and subsequently, from the code that regulates them.
The last fifty years represent the most impactful era in law of the
sea development, due much in part to human innovation. Negotiations
for what would become the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 3 ("UNCLOS" or the "Convention") began almost as
soon as the ink had dried from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Law of the Sea ("GCHS").4 Armed with the technology and legal
authorization to explore and exploit 5 the ocean's resources more than
ever before, States demanded a complex system of laws that zonally
protected their economic rights, while also preserving Grotius' call for
1. VIRGIL, JOHN CAREY & KNIGHTLY CHETWOOD, THE WORKS OF VIRGIL,

VOL. II 31 (John Carey ed., Mr. Dryden trans., James Swan Press 1803).
2. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 8 (Magoffin ed., 1916) [hereinafter
GROTIUS] (discussing Virgil's treatment of law of hospitality). Hugo Grotius was a
17th century Dutch statesman and scholar who contributed extensively to the
development of international law including some of the most fundamental
underpinnings of the law of the sea.
See Hugo Grotius, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/246809/
Hugo-Grotius.
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
4. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas Apr. 29 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
In 1960, The Secretary-General convened a Second UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS II) to consider the topics of the breadth of the territorial sea and
fishery limits; discussions, however, were ultimately deferred. Second United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, PENCE LAW LIBRARY (Feb. 10, 2013),
http://wcl.american.1ibguides.com/content.phhp?pid=455926&sid=4072006.
5. See UNCLOS, art. 56, supra note 3.
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the freedom of navigation. 6 The Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ")7
was a response to the States' demand for bifurcated rights by allowing
coastal States 8 to possess certain exclusive economic privileges within
a 200 nautical mile 9 zone adjacent to their territorial sea.' 0 The
Convention, however, granted States not only the exclusive right to
economic resources but, almost more importantly, the enforcement
power to protect that right."
1956
advent of containerization,1 2 which was
The
contemporaneous with the partitioning of the seas, was "one of the
most important innovations affecting the conduct of international trade
in the second half of the twentieth century."l3 With containerization
came an increase in the amount of crewmembers and flag State' 4
Vessels 1 now operating in a considerably more regulated area. 16 With
6. See generally GROTIUS, supra note 2.
7. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 55.
8. A coastal State is a State (a nation) that is adjacent to an ocean. See 16
U.S.C. § 1453(4) (2014) (Under U.S. law, the definition is broken down further into
the states of the Union that are adjacent to a body of water: "The term 'coastal state'
means a state of the United States in, or bordering on, the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic
Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, [or] Long Island Sound. . .
9. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 57.
10. Id. ("Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in
accordance with this Convention.").
11. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, with respect to artificial islands,
installations and structures in the coastal State's EEZ.
12. MARC LEVINSON, THE Box: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE
WORLD SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 1 (2006). By 1974 most of

North America, Europe, and East Asia had adopted containerization. Giesla Rua,
Fixed Costs, Network Effects, and the Diffusion of Containerization, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 11 (2012) [hereinafter Rua]. Nine years later, in
1983, "80% of countries had built at least one container port," and "by 2008, only
Gabon, Solomon Islands and Somalia had yet to adopt containerization." Id. at 1011.
13. Rua, supra note 12.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15.

Today, the world fleet is comprised of 103,392 vessels, registered in over

150 nations, and operated by 1.5 million seafarers of nearly every nationality. IMO:
MARITIME KNOWLEDGE CENTRE, International Shipping Facts and Figures Information on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment 7, 9, available at
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/TheRole
andlmportanceoflntemationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-
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increased economic rights, and the power to enforce them, came the
propensity for more coastal and flag State interaction and the
subsequent intersection between the law of the sea and other more
general areas of public international law. One such intersection
between States and public international law is the application of
diplomatic protection theory in the international maritime context.
In 2006 the International Law Commission17 ("JLC") adopted its
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection' 8 ("Draft Articles"). The
Draft Articles codify widely accepted customary normsl 9 on the
diplomatic protection of nationals. 20 Draft Article 18 codifies the
customary norm of the ship-as-a-unit concept as applied to diplomatic
protection.21 Specifically, it secures a flag State's right to espouse
%20Facts%20and%2OFigures.pdf. More than half of those vessels constitute the
world cargo fleet, transporting more than 90 percent of global trade, representing 8.4
billion tons of cargo. Id.
16. "Originally defined as the area beyond the territorial seas of coastal
nations, today the high seas are defined by the LOS Convention as the area seaward
of the EEZs of those nations. Sixty percent of the world's oceans remain in this
zone, where the traditional freedom of the seas still prevails." U.S. COMM'N ON
OCEAN POL'Y, Primer On Ocean Jurisdictions: Drawing Lines In The Water 73
(2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/
fullcolor_rpt/03aprimer.pdf.
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection
with Commentaries, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc.
A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Protection].
19. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Ian Patrick Barry, The
Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged Vessels on the High Seas
Pursuant to Customary InternationalLaw: A Defense of the ProlhferationSecurity
Initiative, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 330 (2004) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 102(2) (1986)). Noted Scholars Mark Janis and John Noyes define
customary international law as a theory based on "state practice and opiniojuris,the
belief that states act in a certain way because they are legally bound to do so."
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (2d ed. 2001).
20. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18; Annemarieke VermeerKiinzli, As If- The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 37, 38
(2007) [hereinafter Vermeer-Kiinzli].
21. The "ship-as-a-unit" concept is the understanding that everything on a
vessel is considered holistically. See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18.
Article 18 codifies the application of this concept regarding diplomatic protection.
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claims on behalf of the crew of a vessel flying the State's flag,
regardless of whether a crewmember shares the nationality of that flag
State.2 2 The Draft Articles are silent, however, on whether a flag
State can espouse a claim on behalf of a non-national crewmember
when that non-national is detained by his or her State of nationality. 23
On November 22, 2013, The International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea ("ITLOS" or the "Tribunal") incorrectly answered that
question in the Arctic Sunrise case.24 There, Russian authorities
arrested a thirty-member crew of the Greenpeace vessel, Arctic
Sunrise, for interfering with drilling operations in the Russian EEZ.2 5
Russian authorities subsequently detained the vessel and crew and
issued indictments for piracy and the Russian crime of hooliganism.2 6
The facts, stipulated to by Greenpeace, are as inconceivable as
ITLOS' decision. In the early morning of September 18, 2013, a
number of rigid-hull inflatable boats dispensed from the Artic
Sunrise.2 7 The occupants sought to protest against the presence of the
offshore, ice-resistant, fixed, oil platform, Prirazlomnaya.28 The
protest entailed "two of their [crewmembers] scaling the wall of the
base of the platform up to a point some distance below the main
deck."2 9 The Russian coastguard intervened.3 0 The coastguard
See id. This concept denotes the well-established ability for a flag State to espouse
claims on behalf of the crew of the vessel, regardless of their nationality. Id. This
concept is referred to throughout this article as Article 18, the ship-as-a-unit concept,
or vessel unity.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. See The "Arctic Sunrise" Case, (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, Order of
Nov.

22,

2013

[hereinafter

Arctic

Sunrise],

http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_

available

at

no.22/Order/C22_Ord_

22_11 2013origEng.pdf.
25. Id.
26. 29 Arctic Sunrise Crewmembers Granted Bail, RT.CoM (Nov. 22, 2013,
3:16 PM), http://rt.com/news/arctic-sunrise-crew-free-143/ [hereinafter RT.COM].
27. Brief for Greenpeace Int'l et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Applicants,
para. 4, The "Arctic Sunrise" Case, (Neth. v. Russ.), Case No. 22, available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/Global/international/briefings/climate/2013
/ITLOS-amicus-curiae-brief-30102013.pdf.
2 8. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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boarded the Arctic Sunrise the following day at 18:35 and confined
the crew to the ship's mess. 3 1 Subsequently, the Russian coastguard
transported the vessel to Murmansk where the crew was taken
ashore. 32 Formal arrests were carried out in the late evening of
September 24, 2013.
The Tribunal permitted the flag State of the Arctic Sunrise, the
Netherlands, to espouse claims on behalf of the multi-national crew
against Russia, despite three of the crewmembers' status as Russian
nationals. 34 ITLOS then issued an order commanding Russia to
release the crew, including Russia's own nationals.3 5
Article 18 neither confirms nor denies the Netherlands' right of
diplomatic protection in this scenario. 3 6 But conceptually, allowing
flag States to bring claims against a non-national's 3 1 State of
nationality is incompatible with some of the most well-established
doctrines of international law, as well as the dualist nature38 of the
international legal system as a whole.
In accordance with
international law, Russia possesses the affirmative right to hold its
citizens accountable under national law for acts committed
extraterritorially because: (1) UNCLOS Article 60 grants Russia
exclusive enforcement jurisdiction in its EEZ, 3 9 and (2) Russia may
invoke a sovereign jurisdictional right over its citizens through the
active nationalityprinciple. 40
The impact of ITLOS' decision not only confuses the customary
application of the ship-as-a-unit concept with regard to diplomatic
protection, but it also undermines the integrity of the Tribunal. Since
international tribunals lack enforcement capabilities, if the law is

31. Id. paras. 5-6.
32. Id. para. 7.
33. Id.
34. See id.paras. 11-13, 105.
35. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
36. See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18.
37. The term "non-national" as used in this article, refers to a crewmember
who does not share the nationality of the vessel.
38. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 48-50 (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE].
39. See infra Part IV.B.1.
40. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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misapplied, a State will simply refuse, as Russia did, 4 1 to comply with
the order. A trend of obstinate State practice to ITLOS' decisions
would be debilitating to the future success of such a young
The Tribunal's order forces the ILC to
international tribunal.
crystallize the distinction between the customary norms it endorsed
under Draft Article 18 and the unprecedented and unsubstantiated
approach employed by the Arctic Sunrise court.
This article will address the conflict between allowing flag States
to espouse claims on behalf of non-national crewmembers detained by
the State in which they hold national citizenship and the very
Part II provides
foundation of the international legal system.
background on UNCLOS, ITLOS, and its forms of compulsory
jurisdiction, traditional diplomatic protection theory, and flag State
standing. Part III addresses Article 18 in its present form as a
representation of customary international law. Part IV evaluates the
Arctic Sunrise case and how the Tribunal's order is incompatible with
Russia's right to hold its nationals accountable for extraterritorial
conduct under UNCLOS Article 60, as well the active nationality
principle. Part V proffers two conceivable, but improbable, scenarios
where an international tribunal could compel a sovereign State to
release that State's own nationals. Part VI concludes and suggests the
ILC should crystallize Article 18's application by making it clear that
the ship-as-a-unit concept does not extend to diplomatic claims made
on behalf of nationals detained by their State of nationality.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea
In 1994 UNCLOS entered into force representing a
comprehensive and universally agreed upon regime for the seas and
regulating the ocean including its space, use, and resources.4 2 Beyond

41. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 9.
42. Helmut Tuerk, The Contribution of the InternationalTribunalfor the Law
of the Sea to International Law, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 289, 290 (2007)
[hereinafter The Contributionof the InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea].
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regulating the sea itself, this "Constitution for the Oceans" 43 also
created ITLOS.4 4
1. The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
ITLOS is "an independent judicial body established by [UNLOS]
to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application
of the Convention." 4 5 UNCLOS created ITLOS as part "of its
compulsory third-party dispute settlement system," 46 and for the
rendering of advisory opinions.4 7
Headquartered in Hamburg,
Germany, the Tribunal had its first working session in October 199648
and is now fully operational. 49 The Tribunal represents the largest
international judicial body, composed of twenty-one judges,5 0 and

43. Id. (citing T.T.B. Koh, A Constitutionfor the Oceans, Remarks Made by
the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in
OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES

AND INDEX, E.83.V.5, p. xxxiii).
44. See INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, www.itlos.org

(last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [hereinafter ITLOS Website].
45. Id.
46. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 110 (1998) [hereinafter The InternationalTribunalfor the
Law of the Sea].
47. The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea,
supra note 42, at 292. ITLOS issued its first advisory opinion following "a request
for an advisory opinion concerning administration of the International Seabed
Area." Samuel J. Zeidman, Sittin' on the Dhaka the Bay: The Dispute Between
Bangladesh and Myanmar and Its Implicationsfor the InternationalTribunalfor the
Law of the Sea, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 442, 451 (2012) [hereinafter Zeidman]
(citing Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities
with Respect to Activities in the International Seabed Area, Draft Advisory Opinion,
ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber (Feb. 1, 2011)).
48. John Shamsey, Itlos vs. Goliath: The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of
the Sea Stands Tall with the Appellate Body in the Chilean-Eu Swordfish Dispute, 12
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 515 (2002) [hereinafter Shamsey].

49. Id.; see ITLOS Website, supra note 44. ITLOS became active on October
1, 1996. The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea,
supra note 42, at 292.
50. The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea,
supra note 42, at 294.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/4

10

Drenan: Gone Overboard: Why the Arctic Sunrise Case Signals an Over-Expan

118 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
"despite the seemingly slow start ... its usage rate thus far compares
relatively well with those of other nascent international tribunals." 5 '
ITLOS' jurisdiction is unique in comparison to other international
tribunals; 52 an ex post special agreement, or compromis, is not
required to establish jurisdiction. 53 In addition to the compulsory
jurisdiction UNCLOS provides, ITLOS derives its jurisdiction from
other international agreements. 54 Specifically, UNCLOS Article 288
provides that if ITLOS is a conceivable forum for two states under the
Convention, the Tribunal may hear "any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to
the purpose of... [the] Convention."5 5 Pertinent to the discussion,
ITLOS also distinguishes itself from other international tribunals,
most notably the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), in permitting
non-state entities to bring cases before it."
In general, the Tribunal possesses jurisdiction57 over any disputes
implicating the law of the sea, including maritime boundary disputes,

51. Zeidman, supra note 47, at 475 (citing The Contribution of the
InternationalTribunalforthe Law of the Sea, supra note 42, at 293-94).
52. Shamsey, supra note 48, at 515; see, e.g., Charles F. Whitman, Palestine's
Statehood and Ability to Litigate in the InternationalCourt of Justice, 44 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 73 (2013) (discussing the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction).
53. See The International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, supra note 46, at
32.
54. Shamsey, supra note 48, at 516.
55. Id. (citing Hugh Caminos, The Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea: An Overview, in OCEANS POLICY-NEW INSTITUTIONS,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES XI-XIII 98-99 (Myron H. Nordquist & John
Moore eds., 1999)).
56. Shamsey, supra note 48, at 516; see infra Part II.A.2.b. for a discussion of
private parties bringing prompt release cases on behalf of the flag State under
UNCLOS Article 292.
57. While ITLOS' jurisdiction is notably broad regarding disputes arising out
of the interpretation of the Convention, and law of the sea issues in general, it is not
competent to adjudicate any claim that comes before it. See UNCLOS, supra note
3, art. 288. This is to say that, regarding the subject matter of claims, the
International Court of Justice would be one of the few international tribunals capable
of adjudicating a case involving a multitude of intersecting issues. See infra Part
V.B., regarding ITLOS' inability to adjudicate claims under the European
Convention on Human Rights.
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fisheries, sea pollution, or marine scientific research.58 Articles 297
and 298, however, impose some restrictions on the jurisdictional reach
of the Tribunal relating to certain discretionary powers of coastal
States and the rights of States Parties to exclude categories of disputes
from compulsory jurisdiction,5 9 including sea boundaries or military
activities. 60 These exceptions to the compulsory procedures are made
through written declarations.61
As of 2012 only thirty-three
declarations had been made exempting States from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.6 2 The practical effect of a declaration,
however, can be profound. This manifested itself in the Arctic Sunrise
case, where Russia disputed ITLOS' jurisdiction based on its
declaration upon ratifying the Convention, and subsequently refused
to partake in the proceedings that followed.63
58. The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea,
supra note 42, at 293-94.
59. See infra Part II.A.2. for a discussion of ITLOS' forms of compulsory
jurisdiction provided by UNCLOS Articles 290 and 292.
60. The Contribution of the International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea,
supra note 42, at 292. Maritime delimitation cases had previously been heard by the
ICJ (the other forum allowed by UNCLOS) or gone to private arbitration. Zeidman,
supra note 47, at 451.
61. HELMET TUERK, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA
130 (2012) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA].
Despite the fact that the United States is not a States Party to the Convention, it has
been recommended that the United States make the following declaration:
The government of the United States of America declares, in accordance
with article 287(1), that it chooses the following means for the settlement
of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention:
(A) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII
for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of the articles of the Convention relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection and
preservation of the marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and
(4) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping; and (B)
an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII for the
settlement of disputes not covered by the declaration in (A) above.
J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 760 (3rd ed.
2012) [hereinafter EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS].
62. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at
130.
63. "Upon ratification of the Convention on 2 6th February 1997 the Russian
Federation made a statement, according to which, inter alia, 'it does not accept
procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding
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2. Relevant Forms of Compulsory Jurisdiction
UNCLOS contains a comprehensive system for dispute settlement
at the international level representing perhaps the most sophisticated
of its kind.64 It represents a collage of compromises. Compulsory
dispute settlement surfaced as a necessary stipulation of several States,
hopeful that obligatory jurisdiction would promote observance of
Convention norms. 65 UNCLOS delegates two forms of compulsory
jurisdiction to ITLOS in the form of provisional measures under
Article 290 and for prompt release applications under Article 292.66 It
is these two forms of compulsory jurisdiction in which flag States
have and will continue to espouse claims on behalf of non-national
crewmembers. 67
ITLOS has been entrusted with instances of compulsory
jurisdiction because the function of the jurisdiction cannot be effected
by arbitral tribunals. 68 The drafters of UNCLOS ultimately decided
that provisional measures and prompt release decisions required a
permanently established Tribunal that would allow for the
development of a body of law. 69 UNCLOS provides ITLOS with
decisions with respect to disputes. . . concerning law-enforcement activities in
regard to the exercise of the sovereign rights of jurisdiction."' Arctic Sunrise, supra
note 24, para. 9.
64. John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-PartyJurisdictionand the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675 (1989)
[hereinafter Compulsory Third-Party Jurisdiction And the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea]. In addition to the complex dispute resolution
system, most commentators agree that UNCLOS has the ability to evolve with
international maritime law. See Erik Franckx, Should the Law Governing Maritime
Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Changing Climactic Circumstances?,41 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 397, 422 (2011) ("[T]he overall adaptive capacity of this document has not been
considered inferior to other dynamics of living instruments.").
65. Compulsory Third-Party Jurisdiction And the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64, at 675.
66. UNCLOS, supra note 3, arts. 290, 292.
67.

See generally REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA,

supra note 61, at 144 (Nine of the twenty-two cases before ITLOS have been
prompt release cases under Article 292.).
68. Id. at 130 (citing T. Treves, The Jurisdictionof the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea, 37 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 400 (1997)).
69. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at

130 (citing Judge R. Wolfrum, President of ITLOS, Statement to the Sixth
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residual compulsory jurisdiction in carrying out the adjudication of
provisional measures and prompt release requests because of the
The
temporal sensitivity associated with these pleadings. 70
negotiators of the Convention feared giving comprehensive deference
to arbitral tribunals could lead to undue delays."
A States Party is supposed to have accepted compulsory
procedure as a result of its ratification of UNCLOS. 72 And, unlike the
International Court of Justice Statute, 73 no separate declaration is
required to accept the compulsory procedure of UNCLOS and the
Tribunal.7 4 Understanding the jurisdictional vehicles flag States
employ in requesting the release of non-national crewmembers
highlights the flaw committed by the Arctic Sunrise court in ordering
the release of Russian detainees held in and by Russia.
a. ProvisionalMeasures: Article 290
Article 290(1) provides ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction "where a
dispute on the merits has been submitted to it" 75 providing the
Tribunal prima facie jurisdiction.7 6 Once jurisdiction is established
under Article 290(1), the Tribunal "may prescribe any provisional
measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to
preserve the respective rights of the parties ... or to prevent serious

Committee of the UN General Assembly, 20 October 2006, at 6, available at
www.itlos.org).
70. See Compulsory Third-Party Jurisdiction And the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 64, at 677-78.
71. Id. at 675.
72. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at
130.
73. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, June 26, 1945,
15 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
74. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at
135. (The ICJ usually requires a compromis, where the States submit themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court; UNCLOS, however, provides the jurisdictional trigger
for ITLOS.).
75. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at
135; see UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 290, para. 1.
76. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 290, para. 1.
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harm to the marine environent ... ."n In the Arctic Sunrise case,
the Tribunal's order for Russia to release the crew, albeit incorrect
with respect to the Russian nationals, represents an attempt to preserve
the Netherlands' rights under UNCLOS. 7 8 The Netherlands brought
the Arctic Sunrise case as a request for provisional measures because
the detention did not arise out of a fishing or pollution violation
reserved for prompt release applications under UNCLOS Article
292.79 Therefore, under ITLOS' jurisdiction, the Netherlands' best
pleading option was a request for provisional measures under
UNCLOS Article 290. The Netherlands also likely petitioned ITLOS
under Article 290 because of the discretionary and equitable nature of
provisional measures as well as the urgency that is borne in mind in
evaluating the propriety of their prescription."o Provisional measures
may be made pending the final decision on the merits8 ' and are ripe
for modification or revocation "as soon as the circumstances justifying
them have changed." 82 Revision of provisional measures may occur
only at the request of one of the parties and following an opportunity
to be heard.8 3 It is the Tribunal's responsibility to inform the parties
of subsequent modifications. 84
77. Id. "The Term 'marine environment,' as used in the Convention, includes
'marine life,' so that a competent court or tribunal may prescribe provisional
conservation for living marine resources under the respective rights of the parties."
EXCESsIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at 760.
78. See Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
79. See infra Part II.A.2.b. for the requirements necessitated for a prompt
release application under UNCLOS Article 292.
80. See generally The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra
note 46, at 137 (citing M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Provisional
Measures, Case No. 2, Order of Mar. 11, 1998, para. 5 n.5 (separate opinion of
Judge Laing), available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/
caseno_2/provisional-measures/order_110398_so laing-eng.pdf).
81. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 290, para. 1.
82. Id. art. 290, para. 2.
83. Id. art. 290, para. 3.
84. Id. art. 290, para. 4. Additionally, Article 290(5) provides ITLOS
compulsory jurisdiction when such a dispute has been submitted to an arbitral
tribunal that is pending constitution, and provides that if the tribunal chosen by the
parties fails to provide provisional measures within two weeks of submission,
"[ITLOS] ... may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures ... if . . the
urgency of the situation so requires." Id. art. 290, para. 5. Provisional measures
made out of necessity by ITLOS may be subsequently modified by the tribunal to
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b. PromptRelease: Article 292
Prompt release applications represent the primary medium
through which flag States request the release of nationals and nonnationals alike, as this is the specific purpose for its inclusion under
the Convention.85 An application for prompt release was not the
source of jurisdiction employed in the Arctic Sunrise case.8 6 But, if
ITLOS had ordered Russia to release Russian nationals under a
prompt release application, instead of Article 290, Russia would have
been equally justified in refusing to honor the Tribunal's request.8
UNCLOS Article 292 is the second form of residual compulsory
jurisdiction contained in the Convention.8 8 It provides for expedited
dispute settlement to address allegations that a States Party has not
complied with the UNCLOS provisions regarding the prompt release
of a vessel and crew of another States Party. 89 Issues pertaining to the
release of vessels and crew had traditionally been reserved for the
national admiralty jurisdiction of the various States. 90 Conceptually,
the inclusion of compulsory jurisdiction in the Convention implicates

which the dispute was originally submitted in accordance with the procedure set
forth in Article 290. See id. art. 290. Parties to the Convention are obligated to
comply promptly with provisional measures made under Article 290. Id. art. 290,
para. 6.
85. See id. art. 290.
86. See Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 1 ("[O]n 21 October 2013, the
Netherlands filed with the Tribunal a Request for the prescription of provisional
measures .. . under article 290.").
87. See infra Part IV. (Russia was justified in denying the release of Russian
Nationals, not because of a procedural issue under Articles 290 or 292, but because
the order to do so violated Russia's rights under well-founded doctrines of
international law such as criminal enforcement and nationality jurisdiction.).
88. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292.
89. EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at 760; UNCLOS, supra

note 3, art. 292, para. 1. Article 292 has been described as a "human rights
mechanism," protecting the master and crew through an application for prompt
release. MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 33

(Martinus Nijhoff 2007) [hereinafter GAVOUNELI]; see also Bernard H. Oxman,
Observationson Vessel Release Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 11 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 2, 201-15 (1996).

90. The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea, supra note 46, at 141.
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relationships at all levels of the international legal community,
including ITLOS, individuals, States, and national courts. 9 1
Procedurally, prompt release applications are fairly simple. Under
Article 292(1), if after ten days a States Party has not complied with
the provisions of the Convention for prompt release, "the question of
release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal
agreed upon by the parties" 92 under UNCLOS Article 28793 or to
ITLOS, excepting ancillary agreements of the parties. 94
The
application for release may only be made by or on behalf of the flag
State. 95 The court or tribunal to which the prompt release application
is brought may "deal only with the question of release, without
prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic
forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew." 96 Assuming a State
establishes standing through its flag,97 "[u]pon the posting of the bond
or other financial security determined by the court or tribunal, the
authorities of the detaining State shall comply promptly with the
decision of the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or
its crew." 98
The original drafters proposed the language that ultimately
became Article 292 in response to coastal States' and others States'
strong objections to granting private persons access to international
forums.99 Article 292 has shown to be incredibly effective and has
been employed in almost fifty percent of the cases ITLOS has heard
since its 1999 inception. 00 However, as much as flag States employ
91. Id.
92. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292, para. 1.
93. See infra Part II.A.2.a. for a discussion of State declarations.
94. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292, para. 1.
95. Id. art. 292, para. 2.
96. Id. art. 292, para. 3.
97. See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of flag State standing.
98. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292, para. 14.
99. 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY 70 (Myron Nordquist et al., 1995) [hereinafter UNCLOS
COMMENTARY].
100. EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at 164 n.11; see
GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 33 n.4 ("The success of the new procedure is evident
in the fact that more than half of the cases adjudicated so far by the [ITLOS] refer to
prompt release proceedings ... ."). Cases adjudicated by ITLOS involving prompt
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Article 292 to compel the release of vessels, flag states may only use
prompt release applications for detentions relating to fishing or
pollution violations.101 Crewmembers are naturally included in
prompt release proceedings, as they are part of the vessel unit.10 2
Normal practice involves the submission of the prompt release
applications directly from the flag State to the detaining State, as in
the Volga case where a member of Russia's Foreign Ministry made
the submission directly from the Russian Federation.' 03
Private parties, however, may also further their interests before
ITLOS.104 As stated in Article 292(2), the question of release may be
submitted "on behalf' of the flag state. 0 5 Indeed, six of the nine
prompt release cases submitted to ITLOS have been brought on behalf
of the flag State.1 06 The rules of the Tribunal allow a flag State to
give private parties authorization (even prior to the existence of a
dispute) to bring prompt release applications on behalf of the flag

release applications include: The "Tomimaru" Case (Japan v. Russ.), Prompt
Release, Case No. 15, Order of July 9, 2007, available at www.itlos.org; The
"Hoshinmaru" Case (Japan v. Russ.), Prompt Release, Case No. 14, Order of July 9,
2007, available at www.itlos.org; The "Juno Trader" Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea),
Case No. 13, Order of Dec. 1, 2004, available at www.itlos.org; The "Volga" Case
(Russ. v. Austl.), Prompt Release, Case No. 11, Order of Dec. 2, 2002 [hereinafter
Volga], available at www.itlos.org; The "Chaisiri Reefer 2" Case (Pan. v. Yemen),
Prompt Release, Case No. 9, Order of July 13, 2001, available at www.itlos.org;
The "Grand Prince" Case (Belize v. Fr.), Prompt Release, Case No. 8, Order of Mar.
21, 2001 [hereinafter Grand Prince], available at www.itlos.org; The "Camouco"
Case (Pan. v. Fr.), Prompt Release, Case No. 5, Order of Jan. 17, 2000, available at
www.itlos.org; M/V Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Prompt Release, Case No.
1, Order of Nov. 21, 1997, available at www.itlos.org.
101. EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at 433.
102. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at

142 (citing Judge J.L. Jesus, President of ITLOS, Statement to the Informal Meeting
of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 27 October 2009, at 6, available
at www.itlos.org).
103.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at

142 n.815 (citing P. Gautier, Les affaires de 'prompte mainlevg' devant le Tribunal
international du droit de la mer, 3/d GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 85 (2003) (Fr.)).
104. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at

141.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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State.' 0 7 In practice, vessel owners negotiate the right to bring claims
on behalf of the flag State in the event a dispute arises with a coastal
State. 08 This concept extends the already strained legal fiction of
diplomatic protection in the ship-as-a-unit context, as the private
parties are not required to be nationals of the flag State. Conceptually,
if the Arctic Sunrise court's extension of the ship-as-a-unit concept is
accepted, absurd results could ensue-individuals that do not share the
nationality of the vessel could compel a sovereign State to release its
own nationals.' 09
B. Diplomatic Protection:An Introduction

The ship-as-a-unit concept codified in Article 18 involves several
rather liberal exceptions to the traditional understanding of diplomatic
protection.' 10 For that reason, it should be narrowly construed. A
discussion of diplomatic protection as it evolved under public
international law is necessary to evaluate the impropriety of ITLOS'
extension of the ship-as-a-unit notion in the Arctic Sunrise context.
Conceptually, diplomatic protection is a mechanism engineered to
secure reparation to a State based on the legal fiction that the injury to
107. Id. Article 292(2) is distinct from the rule shaped by the Arctic Sunrise
court as it allows non-national vessel owners the ability to file prompt release
applications despite the fact that they do not possess the same national citizenship as
the flag their vessel flies. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292, para. 2, with
Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105. The rule distilled from the Arctic Sunrise
case allows the flag State to espouse claims on behalf of non-national crewmembers,
including those who share the nationality of the offending state. Arctic Sunrise,
supra note 24, para. 105.
108. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 61, at
141.
109. Under ITLOS' rationale, if Russia had arrested the Arctic Sunrise for a
pollution or fishing violation, and the Netherlands had delegated prompt release
rights to a Greenpeace official, that individual, regardless of his or her nationality,
could have compelled the Russian Federation to release its own nationals. The
absurdity of this scenario is not comprehendible, but is possible, however,
considering together the stipulations under Article 292, and the Tribunal's extension
of Article 18 in the Arctic Sunrise case.
110. See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18. See infra Part II.B.1.
(The exemption of the nationality requirement is the most obvious and important
exception recognized by Article 18 and is a representation of customary
international law.).
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one of its nationals is an injury to the State itself."' The ILC
recognizes, however, that the legal fiction supporting the concept of
diplomatic protection is an "exaggeration," for it is obvious that the
State itself is not injured contemporaneously with one of its
nationals." 2 This Section outlines the traditional understanding of
diplomatic protection, highlighting the hyperbolic fiction that Article
18 exhausts.
The Draft Articles define diplomatic protection as:
[T]he invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other
means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State
for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State
to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State
with a view to the implementation of such responsibility." 3
In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") submitted that "by taking up
the case of one of its subjects and by restoring to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality
asserting its own right, the right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law."ll 4 The legal foundation for
the PCIJ's reasoning is grounded in the work of a Swiss jurist,
Emmerich de Vattel, who noted in 1758 that "whoever ill-treats a
citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect the citizen."" 5
Traditionally, the responsibility of a State may not be invoked if:

111. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., art. 1, May 1-June 9, July 3Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006)
[hereinafter Diplomatic Protection Commentary]; Vermeer-Kiinzli, supra note 20, at
38 ("[T]he injury to an individual is treated as if it constituted an injury to the
individual's national state, thereby entitling the national state to espouse the
claim.").
112. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 1.
113. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 1.
114. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. I (quoting
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at
12 (Aug. 30)); see also Vermeer-Kiinzli, supra note 20, at 38.
115. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 1 (quoting 3 E.
DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED
TO THE CONDUCT AND TO AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 136 (C.G.

Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution, Washington 1916) (1758)).
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"[(1)] the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule
relating to the nationality of claims; [and] [(2)] the claim is one to
which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any
available and effective local remedy has not been exhausted."ll 6
1. Nationalityof Claims
Subject to limited exceptions, one of which includes Article 18, a
claimant that cannot establish the nationality of a claim will be barred
because no legal interest exists on its part." 7 Draft Article 5 defines
the notion as it pertains to individuals: "A state is entitled to exercise
diplomatic protection in respect of a person who was a national of that
State continuously from the date of the injury to the date of the official
presentation of the claim. Continuity is presumed if that nationality
existed at both these dates."" 8 The Commentary to Draft Article 5
establishes nationality of the claim as the centerpiece to diplomatic
protection. 119
Article 18 circumvents the traditional requirement of the
establishment of nationality, as it allows for the espousal of claims for
Instead, Article 18 establishes
non-national crewmembers.1 20
diplomatic protection for non-national crewmembers using the legal
fiction that flag State nationality establishes the vessel as the national
itself.12' Therefore, when the vessel of a State is harmed, the State
incurs the same injury, and an international claim may proceed. 122
2. Exhaustion ofLocal Remedies

Under traditional diplomatic protection theory, a State may not
present an international claim on behalf of an injured person before
116. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 44, adopted by Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., 56 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 10 at 383, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter State
Responsibility].
117. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 702.
118. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 5, para. 1.
119. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 5.
120. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 19.
121.

See id.

122. Id.
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local remedies have been exhausted.1 23 Both the ILC and the ICJ
recognize this facet of diplomatic protection as a customary norm and
prerequisite to the espousal of claims in international tribunals. 1 24 The
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection define local remedies as
remedies available to the injured person "before the judicial or
administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, of the
State alleged to be responsible for causing the injury."l 25 The ICJ
noted the importance of this concept in the Interhandel case, stating
that the "State where the violation occurred should have an
opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its
own domestic system."l 26 If, however, no effective remedy is
available locally because domestic courts lack jurisdiction under their
own law, it may be assumed local remedies have been exhausted, and
international claims may proceed.127
Prompt release applications brought under UNCLOS Article 292,
many of which implicitly invoke Article 18,128 do not require the
exhaustion of local remedies because it would be contrary to the
purpose and design of the application.' 29 The analysis may be
different, however, when a claim is espoused on behalf of a nonnational crewmember against the crewmember's home State. For
instance, in the Arctic Sunrise case, the Russian crewmembers who
were detained by their home State, the Russian Federation, should
have been forced to exhaust their remedies in domestic Russian courts
123. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
124. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.) Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6,
27 (Mar. 21) [hereinafter Interhandel]; Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra
note 111, art. 14.
125. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 14, para. 2.
126. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 14 (citing
Interhandel, supra note 124, at 27).
127. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 713-14.
128. Prompt release cases by their very nature involve the espousing of claims
by flag States on behalf of crewmembers who do not share the nationality of the flag
of the vessel.
129. The purpose of the prompt release remedy is to ensure the swift release of
a crew secured by a bond. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 292. This is evidenced
by the ten-day requirement included in Article 292. See id. Therefore, requiring the
crew to exhaust local remedies in domestic courts would undermine the purpose of
the provision. See supra Part II.A.2.b., for a more detailed discussion of the policy
and purpose underlying prompt release applications.
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before the Netherlands was permitted to espouse claims on their
behalf at the international level.
C EstablishingFlagState Jurisdiction

A State alleging to be the flag State of a vessel must establish
standing as the flag State to effectively espouse a claim on behalf of a
non-national crewmember. Therefore, a brief discussion of the
requirements involved in establishing flag State standing is
appropriate.
The flag a vessel flies classifies the ship's nationality, its place of
registration, and identifies to the international community what legal
jurisdiction the flag State possesses over the vessel.130 Flag states
retain exclusive jurisdiction, "subject to some notable limitations,[131 ]
over their ships on the high seas."' 32 Customary international law, 13
130. CDR David Garfield Wilson, JAGC, USN, Interdiction on the High Seas:
The Role and Authority of A Master in the Boarding and Searching of His Ship by
Foreign Warships, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 157, 168 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson].
131. UNCLOS Article 92 provides that vessels are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag State. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 92. Boarding of a vessel
on the high seas must be "authorised by UNCLOS or general international law,
issue-specific bilateral or multilateral treaties or ad hoc by the flag State." Douglas
Guilfoyle, Human Rights Issues and Non-Flag State Boarding of Suspect Ships in
InternationalWaters, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA

84 (Clive R. Symomons ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2011) [hereinafter Guilfoyle].
UNCLOS Article 110 grants the right to visit on the high seas where a warship has
reasonable grounds for suspecting a vessel is engaged in piracy, engaged in the slave
trade, engaged in unauthorized broadcasting, is without nationality, is the same
nationality as the warship though the vessel is flying a foreign flag, or refuses to
show its flag. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 110. UNCLOS "allocates a universal
competence for States to visit and inspect vessels" suspected of engaging in the
enumerated offenses described in Article 110. Guilfoyle, supra note 131, at 83. An
absolute right to boarding of vessels for the smuggling of narcotics, irregular
migrants, or weapons of mass destruction is not provided for in UNCLOS, but may
be authorized through bilateral or multilateral treaties. Id.
132. Allyson Bennett, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal
Jurisdiction,and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT'L L.
433, 436 (2012) [hereinafter Bennett].
133. Id. (referencing flag State jurisdiction as a customary norm); Edwin
Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics,
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 145-46 (1996) [hereinafter
Anderson, III] (discussing flag State jurisdiction as a notion of customary
international law).
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as well as UNCLOS Article 92(1), 134 mandate vessels fly under the
flag of only one State.' 3 5
The general provisions required to establish the nationality of a
vessel are defined in UNCLOS Article 91(1):
Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to
fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the
State and the ship. 136
Judge Laing noted in the GrandPrince case that
in the ideal situation, up to three elements may be involved in a
determination of or as ingredients of the nationality of a vessel - (1)
the actual grant of nationality by the flag State, (2) the registration
of the vessel and (3) the flying of the flag State's flag as of right.137
The flag State has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the criteria and
procedures for granting and withdrawing nationality to ships.13 8
Judge Wolfrum submitted, however, that "the registration cannot be
reduced to a mere fiction and serve just one purpose, namely to open

134. "[T]he drafting history of Article 92(1) can be traced to the almost
identical Article 30 of the 1956 draft Articles" prepared by the ILC, the commentary
to which states that "[t]he absence of any authority over ships sailing the high seas
would lead to chaos" and that "a ship must fly the flag of a single State and that it is
the subject to the jurisdiction of that state." Neil Brown,. JurisdictionalProblems
Relating to Non-Flag State Boarding of Suspect Ships in International Waters: A
Practitioner'sObservations, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 70 (Clive R. Symomons ed., Martinus Nijhoff 2011) (citing 3 UNCLOS
COMMENTARY, supra note 99).
135.

YOSHIFUMU

TANAKA,

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF THE SEA

155

(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter TANAKA].
136. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 91, para. 1.
137. Grand Prince, supra note 100, para. 2 (Separate Opinion of Judge Laing).
138. M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Provisional Measures, Case
No. 2, Order of Mar. 11, 1998, para. 65 [hereinafter M/V Saiga (No. 2)], available
at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no_2/merits/Judgment.
01.07.99.E.pdf; see TANAKA, supra note 135, at 141.
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the possibility to initiate proceedings under article 292 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea."l 39
The only caveat to the unimpeded freedom afforded to the flag
State to establish its flagging procedure is the nebulous requirement of
a genuine link between the vessel and the flag State.' 4 0 The
Nottenbohm case, decided by the ICJ in 1955, provides the genesis for
the genuine link requirement.141 Also, the notion was included in
Article 5 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of Sea, just three
years later.14 2 The application of this principle to vessel nationality is
"tenuous at best"l43 and registration, as defined by the flag State, is
the only method to establish "reciprocal rights and duties."l44
Because registration may be considered evidence of a genuine link,14 5
it is the registration itself that creates the link between the vessel and
flag State. 146
Consistent with this understanding, ITLOS noted in the M/VSaiga
(No. 2) case that:
[T]he purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a
genuine link between a ship and its flag State is to secure more
effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to
establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the
registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other
States. 14
Thus, "[n]othing in the Convention [or a customary norm] permits a
state that questions the existence of a genuine link to disregard the
jurisdiction of the flag state over the ship."l48
139. Grand Prince, supra note 100, para. 3 (declaration of Judge Wolfrum).
140. Anderson, III, supra note 133, at 145-46.
141. The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) [hereinafter
Nottebohm], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum-215&pl=3
&p2=3&case=1 8&p3 =5.
142. See Anderson, III, supra note 133, at 148.
143. Id. at 149.
144. Id.
145. GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 17.
146. Id.; see, e.g., Grand Prince, supra note 100, paras. 82-83.
147. MN Saiga (No. 2), supra note 138, para. 83.
148. Louis B. SOHN, KRISTEN GUSTAFSON JURAS, JOHN E. NOYES & ERICK
FRANCKX, LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL 51 (2d ed. 2010).
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The registration and subsequent flagging of a vessel "creates a
permanent legal relationship between the ship and the State."1 49 it
also provides the State the right to assert jurisdiction and diplomatic
protection over the vessel.15 0 But, such privileges come with
obligations.15 1 Specifically, UNCLOS Article 94 makes it the flag
State's responsibility to "effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical, and social matters over ships
flying its flag." 5 2 This responsibility includes diligence in overseeing
activities central to vessel operation such as the construction,
equipment, and seaworthiness of ships.' 5 3 Despite the obligations
defined in the Convention, a case has never been brought before
ITLOS on this matter.154
"Flags of convenience" emerged during the post-World War II
economic boom when ship owners began to register their vessels
where they could operate at the lowest cost, thus abandoning the
previous custom of registering in their country of nationality.' 5 5 Ship
registries are categorized into "closed" or "national" registers,
"second" registers, and "open" registers. 156
*Closed" registers
generally exclude registration to vessels that are not owned by
individuals or entities located in the flag State.15 "Second" registers
are similar to "closed" registers in that a majority of the owners and
crew are nationals of the flag State but represent a middle ground
because they embody some features of an "open" register.15 8 "Open"
149. GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 17.
150. See id.
151. Id. These obligations include, "the obligation to effectively exercise
jurisdiction or control in administrative, technical and social matters, from the
construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships to the meaning, labour
conditions and the training of crews on board." Id.
152. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 94, para. 1.
153. See id. para. 3.
154. GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 17 (citing Davis R. Robinson, Recourse
Against Flag Statesfor Breaches of Their InternationalObligations Under the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, in CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 371-83 (Myron N. Nordquist

& John N.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Moore eds., 2001)).
See Wilson, supra note 130, at 157.
Id.
See id.
See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/4

26

Drenan: Gone Overboard: Why the Arctic Sunrise Case Signals an Over-Expan

134 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
registers are synonymous with "flags of convenience." 1 59 They
encourage vessel owners to matriculate to States that offer "lower or
no taxes, low labor standards, and loose environmental and safety
regulations." 60 Accordingly, "flags of convenience" allow States
with no connection to the vessel to espouse claims on the crew's
behalf in international forums. It is this evolution of ship registration
that is likely responsible for the wide-spread acceptance of the shipas-a-unit concept. 161
III. ARTICLE 18: A REPRESENTATION

OF CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The InternationalLaw Commission
The ILC, which is the drafting body of the Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection, grew out of nineteenth and early twentiethcentury efforts to codify international law, and was established by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1947.162 In carrying out its mandate to
progressively develop and codify international law, the Commission
may consider draft conventions prepared by organs of the United
Nations other than the General Assembly, as well as "specialized
agencies, or official bodies established by intergovernmental
agreement." 63 The members of the ILC are elected by the General
Assembly because of their prowess and expertise in specific areas of
159. See id. "Many in the maritime shipping industry use the term 'flags of
convenience' or 'open registry' in reference to ships registered (i.e. flagged) in a
state in which both the ships and their owners have little or no contact, but for the
registration itself" Id.
160. Id.
161. Given the diversity of crewmembers and nations at sea, it makes sense
that States want their nationals to be protected by the flag State. At the same time,
the ship-as-a-unit concept in the diplomatic protection context is swallowed up by
the fact that many of the "flags of convenience" are third-world States that offer no
ability to assert claims on behalf of their own nationals, let alone non-national
crewmembers. See supra note 15, for statistics on the volume and diversity of
seafarers.
162. Louis B. SoHN, JOHN E. NOYES, ERIK FRANCKX & KRISTEN JURAS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA].

163. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res 174 (II), art. 17,
para. 1 (Nov. 21, 1947) [hereinafter ILC Statute].

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

27

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

GoNE OVERBOARD

2014]

135

international law.164 This prowess and expertise ensures the ILC
carries out the goal of Article 13(1). 165
Article 15 of the ILC Statute defines two roles, including: (1) the
progressive development of international law, meaning "the
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not
yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States,"' 6 6 and (2)
the codification of "the more precise formulation and systemization of
rules of international law in fields where there already has been
extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine." 67 Article 18
represents the ILC at work in the latter capacity, as extensive State
practice supports the ship-as-a-unit concept as a representation of
customary international law.1 6 8
B. Draft Article 18: Codiying the Ship-As-A-Unit Concept
In May 2006 the ILC adopted its Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection, codifying widely accepted customary norms on the
diplomatic protection of nationals.' 69 Article 18 of the Draft Articles
operates contrary to the traditional constructs of international
diplomacy law. 1 70 It extends the right of diplomatic protection to the
flag State of a vessel over the entire crew regardless of whether the
crewmember shares the nationality of the flag State. 1 7 ' Article 18,
however, is silent on whether a flag State's right to espouse claims on
behalf of non-nationals extends to scenarios where a non-national
crewmember is detained by his or her State of nationality.172 Perhaps
originally just an unlikely hypothetical, the scenario became a reality
in the Arctic Sunrise case when ITLOS ordered Russia to release
Russian crewmembers arrested on a Dutch flag vessel. 7 3
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note

162.

U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1.
ILC Statute, supra note 163, art. 15, para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
See infra Part III.B.
Vermeer-Kinzli, supra note 20, at 37-38.
See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18.
See id.
See id.
Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
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The Commentary to Article 18 contends that the concept of vessel
unity in the context of diplomatic protection is a representation of
customary international law. 174
Indeed, the practice of States,
international
courts,
and the most highly qualified
domestic and
5
7
publicists1 accept a flag State's right to espouse claims on behalf of
the crew of a vessel flying its flag. This concept has been historically
recognized and is still presently respected.176 Article 18 states:
The right of the State of nationality of the members of the crew of a
ship to exercise diplomatic protection is not affected by the right of
the State of nationality of a ship to seek redress on behalf of such
crew members, irrespective of their nationality, when they have
been injured in connection with an injury to the vessel resulting
from an internationally wrongful act.
As codified by Article 18, decisions of international and domestic
tribunals are consistent in their recognition and treatment of the shipas-a-unit concept in the diplomatic protection context. Before the
Arctic Sunrise case the Tribunal properly implemented the ship-as-aunit concept in prompt release and provisional measures cases; the
concept was thought of as a meaningful contribution to international
law.' 7 8 In the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case the Tribunal noted, "the ship,
every thing on it, and every person involved or interested in its
operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag State. The
nationalities of these persons are not relevant." 79 The Tribunal

174. See generally Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 18
(The support offered by the accompanying Commentary indicates that the ILC as
well as the international community regards the ship-as-unit concept to be a
customary norm.).
175. The International Court of Justice recognizes the works of the most
highly qualified scholars under the ICJ Statute. See ICJ Statute, supra note 73, art
38, para. 1.
176. Diplomatic Protection Commentary, supra note 111, art. 18 ("There is
support in the practice of States, in judicial decisions and in the writing of publicists,
for the position that the state of nationality (the flag State) may seek redress for
members of the crew of the ship who do not have its nationality.").
177. Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18.
178. See Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, separate opinion of Judge Jesus, paras.
18-19.
179. M/V Saiga (No.2), supra note 138, para. 106.
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conclisively stated that claims may be brought on behalf of nonnatiohals, "irrespective of their nationality."s180
ITLOS reaffirmed flag State standing in the The Grand Prince
case: "it is the flag State of the vessel that is given locus standi to
make up the question of release in an appropriate court or tribunal.
Any other entity may make an application only on behalf of the flag
Additionally, the Arctic Sunrise court
State of the vessel."'"'
implicitly accepted the concept of vessel unity pertaining to
crewmembers when it allowed a State to bring a claim on behalf of a
non-national against their home State.1 82 Even ITLOS' Judge Jesus,
who did not agree with the Dutch espousal of claims over the Russian
nationals, generally acknowledged the ship-as-a-unit concept in his
separate opinion:
I understand that the ship-as-a-unit concept developed by the
Tribunal in the M/V "SAIGA " (No. 2) Case brings under the
international judicial protection of that State all the crew members
of the vessel flying its flag, even if the crew members hold a
different nationality from that of the flag State.

..

. I am in full

agreement that crew members of a ship that hold a nationality
different from that of the flag State should also have the

international judicial protection from that State, as promoted by the
ship-as-a-unit concept. . . . [T]he ship-as-a-unit concept ... is ... a
valuable contribution to international law developed by the
Tribunal in its early case law, [and] a contribution that
complements the institute of diplomatic protection.1 83
While the Tribunal's recognition of diplomatic protection of
crewmembers through the legal fiction of vessel nationality is notable,
the court was not making a novel finding but merely confirming a
well-established doctrine. ICJ Judges Hackworth and Badwi Pasha
both dissented and noted this concept in the Reparationfor Injuries
advisory opinion.184 Judge Hackwork stated that "seamen and aliens

serving in the armed forces ...

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

are assimilated to the status of

Id. para. 104.
Grand Prince, supra note 100, para. 66.
Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
Id., separate opinion of Judge Jesus, paras. 18-20.
1949 I.C.J. 12, 202-03 (Apr. 11).
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nationals." 185 Judge Badwi Pasha submitted that "protection extends
to everyone in the ship . . . independent of nationality" and that
"nationality is satisfied as regards the flag or forces, its absence, in the
case of one or more units or person of a national entity, may be held to
be covered by a principle of the individuality of the flag or the armed
forces." 86 As early as the nineteenth century the Supreme Court of
the United States recognized the relationship between the crew and the
flag State of the vessel it flies.18 7 It found that "[w]here a nation
allows a vessel to sail under her flag, and the crew have the protection
of that flag, common sense and justice require that they should be
punishable by the law of the flag."' 88 Additionally, in the I'm Alone
case, where a U.S. Coast Guard ship sank a Canadian vessel suspected
of smuggling liquor, Canada successfully espoused compensation
claims on behalf of three non-national crewmembers.1 89 The Supreme
Court of the United States contended that when a claim is made on
behalf of a vessel, the crew as a whole shares the nationality of the
vessel.190
In addition to the acceptance of this concept in domestic and
international tribunals, some of the most highly qualified publicists in
international law and the law of the sea have recognized this concept
as part of international diplomacy law. Churchill and Lowe, two of
the most prolific publishers on international law of the sea, find that
"[a] State could . .. exercise the right of diplomatic protection, which
extends to the State's nationals . . . and ships . . . flying its flag."'91

And, the absence of a link of nationality of some kind is ultimately
immaterial.1 92 Jennings and Watts submit that a State may assert
claims on behalf of crewmembers serving on a vessel flying its flag.193
185. Id. at 202-03 (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth).
186. Id. at 206-07 (dissenting opinion of Judge Badwi Pacha).
187. See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
188. Id. at 478.
189. Claim of the British Ship "I'm Alone" v. United States: Reports of the
Commissioners, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 326 (1935).
190. Id.
191.

R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 331 (2nd rev. ed.

1992).
192. Id.
193.

See ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL

LAW 937 (9th ed. 1992).
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Crawford suggests that the ship-as-a-unit concept is an exception to
the general requirements of diplomatic protection: "A right to the
protection of non-nationals may arise from treaty or an ad hoc
arrangement establishing an agency. The other generally accepted
exceptions are alien seamen on ships flying the flag of the protecting
state and members of the armed forces of a state." 194 As much as the
international legal community accepts the ship-as-a-unit concept as
part of the "institute of diplomatic protection," 1 9 5 there is no
customary foundation for the right to be extended to situations where
a crewmember is detained by his or her State of nationality.' 9 6
IV.

THE ARCTIC SUNRISE CASE: THE CONFLICT WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. The Arctic Sunrise Case
On November 22, 2013, ITLOS released its decision in the Arctic
Sunrise case regarding the Kingdom of the Netherlands' request for
provisional measures. 1 The Tribunal ordered Russia to release the
crew of the Arctic Sunrise including those of Russian nationality.1 9 8
This decision substantially undermines the ILC's understanding of
diplomatic protection as stated in Article 18. Presumably, the ILC did
not find it necessary to articulate that Article 18 does not apply in
situations where a national is charged under domestic law and
detained in his or her State of nationality. The application of
diplomatic protection in such a context is at odds with the very

194. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 460 (6th ed. 2003)

195.

Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, separate opinion of Judge Jesus, paras. 18-

19.
196. Article 18, as codified by the ILC, includes the ship-as-a-unit concept as
part of diplomatic protection theory because it is supported by a customary
foundation. See Diplomatic Protection, supra note 18, art. 18. Conversely, the
absence of language explicitly entitling flag States to espouse claims on behalf of
non-nationals detained by their State of nationality should indicate that the ILC did
not consider that scenario to be supported by State practice. See id.
197. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
198. Id.
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foundation and dualist nature1 9 9 of public international law.200
ITLOS' implicit extension of Article 18 in this context creates
dangerous precedent by contradicting the most traditional notions of
international law.
Additionally, the application of Article 18 in this circumstance
places the reputation of ITLOS in jeopardy. If other States follow
Russia's lead and refuse to comply with an order mandating the
release of its own nationals, 201 ITLOS' perceived authority will be
weakened. Alternatively, States that anticipate the application of
diplomatic protection in this manner will likely decline to submit
themselves to the Tribunal regardless of its compulsory jurisdiction.
An international tribunal serves little purpose if its decisions are
not followed. Like most tribunals, ITLOS does not possess an
enforcement arm20 2 -its orders are followed by nations simply out of
respect for the Tribunal and the rule of international law. 203 A trend
of recalcitrant State practice in defying ITLOS decisions would be
debilitating to the present effectiveness and future success of such a
young international tribunal.
The following section addresses the specifics of the Tribunal's
order, how it conflicts with well-established pillars of international
law, and why it demands the ILC's immediate attention.

199. See BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 48 ("Dualism emphasizes the distinct
and independent character of the international and national legal systems.").
200. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the interplay between the foundational
components of public international law and diplomatic protection theory).
201. See Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 9.
202. See, e.g., John M. Scheib, Enforcing Judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights: The Conduit Theory, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 101, 110 (1997)
[hereinafter Scheib] ("In the international context . . . there is no worldwide sheriff

to enforce the judgment. Rather, it has traditionally been assumed that the judgment
or award of satisfaction may be enforced and executed only by the state against
whom the Court renders a judgment."); see also Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675,
682 (2013) (discussing the deference given to international tribunals by domestic
courts: "Given the difficulties in taming and naming this beast, it is not surprising
that federal courts have haphazardly addressed the question of how much deference
should be conferred on international tribunal decisions[]").
203. See supra note 202.
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1. FactualBackground
The substantive legal issues arise out of a colorful factual record.
On September 19, 2013, competent authorities of the Russian
Federation, the Coast Guard of the Federal Security Service of Russia
for Murmansk Oblast ("the Russian coastguard"), 204 arrested the
Dutch flagged Greenpeace 20 5 vessel, Arctic Sunrise.20 6 The arrest was
based on allegations of protesting "against the operation of the
offshore fixed oil platform Prirallomnaya"in the Pechora Sea of the
Russian EEZ.2 0 7 The protest involved staging an attempt to seize the
oil platform. 208 Russian authorities towed the Arctic Sunrise to the
Russian port of Murmansk where the Leninsky District Court
subsequently seized the vessel. 2 09 The Greenpeace activists on board
of the Arctic Sunrise were initially charged with piracy, 2 10 and
"ordered to be held in pre-trial detention for two months." 2 1 ' The
charges were then converted to hooliganism, 2 12 and the crewmembers
"were transferred to the Kresty detention center in St. Petersburg on
November 12."213 Release of the crew on bail began two months after
the arrest, and on December 18 "the Russian State Duma21 4 declared

204. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 88.
205. "Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organization that acts
to change attitudes and behavior, to protect and conserve the environment and to
promote

peace . . . ."

About

Greenpeace,

GREENPEACE.COM,

http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/en/about/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
206. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 88.
207. Anna Dolidze, The Arctic Sunrise and NGOs in InternationalJudicial
Proceedings, 18 A.S.I.L. INSIGHTS 1 (2013) [hereinafter Dolidze], available at
http://www/asil.org.
208. RT.CoM, supra note 26.
209. Dolidze, supra note 207, at 1.
210. It is unclear whether this charge was in conformity with the strict
definition of piracy under UNCLOS Article 101.
211. RT.COM,supra note 26.
212. See infra Part IV.B.1.b. (discussing hooliganism and its applicability to
the Arctic Sunrise case).
213. RT.COM, supra note 26.
214. "After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation in
1993 replaced its old Soviet-era constitution with a new document that revived the
name 'State Duma' for the lower house of the newly created Federal Assembly, or
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amnesty due to the 20th anniversary of the Russian Constitution and
the Arctic Sunrise crew . .. [was] eligible to it." 2 15 By December 29,
2013, all non-Russian crewmembers had left Russia.2 6
The crew became known as the "Arctic 30" and was a truly multinational assemblage 2 17 of thirty individuals consisting of seventeen
different nationalities.21 8 Most importantly, crewmembers Roman
Dolgov, Denis Sinyakov, and Andrey Allakhverdov were Russian

nationals.219
2. Contentions of the Parties
On October 1, 2013, the Embassy of the Russian Federation
addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and
made the following contentions regarding its authority under
international law to arrest and detain the crew of the Arctic Sunrise:
On 19 September. .. within the [EEZ] of the Russian Federation,
on the basis of Articles 56, 60, and 80 of [UNCLOS], and in
accordance with Article 36(1(1)) of the Federal Law 'on the [EEZ]
of the Russian Federation' a visit. .. to the vessel 'Arctic Sunrise'
was carried out.

. .

. In view of the authority that a coastal State

possesses in accordance with the aforementioned rules of
international law, in the situation in question requesting consent of
Russian national parliament."

Duma, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/173419/Duma.
215. Voice of Russia, Russia Drops Charges Against All 30 Drilling
Protesters-Greenpeace, VOICEOFRUSSIA.COM

(Dec.

26,

2013

12:20

PM),

http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_12_26/Russia-drops-charges-against-all-30drilling-protesters-Greenpeace-8528/.
216. Updates
from
the
Arctic
Sunrise,
GREENPEACE.COM
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/en/news/features/From-peaceful-action-todramatic-seizure-a-timeline-of-events-since-the-Arctic-Sunrise-took-actionSeptember-18-CET/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
217. The nationalities of the crewmembers are as follows: United Kingdom, 6;
Russia, 3; Argentina, 2; Canada, 2; Netherlands, 2; New Zealand, 2; Australia, 1;
Brazil, 1; Denmark, 1; Finland, 1; France, 1; Italy, 1; Sweden, 1; Switzerland, 1;
Turkey, 1; Ukraine, 1; and the United States of America, 1. See Meet the Arctic 30,
GREENPEACE.COM, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/arctic30/

(last visited Mar. 28,

2014).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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the flag State to the visit by the inspection team on board the vessel
was not required[.] 220
The procedural posture of the Arctic Sunrise case is as
complicated as the claims for which the case was brought. Because
the Netherlands and Russia "have not accepted the same procedure for
the settlement of disputes" under UNCLOS Article 287, they are
deemed to have accepted the arbitration procedure under the
Convention. 221 Consistent with this understanding, the Netherlands
requested for ITLOS to act as an arbitral tribunal, and to find that: 222
[Russia] breached its obligations to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands ... in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection
of its nationals, and its right to seek redress on behalf of crew
members of a vessel flying the flag of the Kingdom irrespectiveof
their nationality, in regard to the right to liberty and security of a

vessel's crew members and their right to leave the territory and
maritime zones of a coastal state ....

220. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 64.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 3,
art. 110 (discussing the "right to visit"); see supra Part II.C.; see infra Part IV.B.1.c.
(discussing Russia's implementation of domestic enforcement regulations under
international law). UNCLOS Article 56 defines the rights of the Coastal State in the
EEZ. See infra Part IV.B.1.b. UNCLOS Article 60 defines Coastal States' rights
regarding artificial islands and installations in the EEZ. See infra Part IV.B.1.c.
UNCLOS Article 80 extends the rights under Article 60 to the continental shelf:
"Article 60 applies mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and structures
on the continental shelf." UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 80.
221. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 2.
222. In addition to seeking the right to espouse claims on behalf of the crew,
the Netherlands also asked ITLOS to find that the Russian Federation:
(1) in boarding, investigating, inspecting, arresting and detaining the
'Arctic Sunrise' . . . breached its obligations to the Kingdom of the
Netherlands ... in regard to the freedom of navigation. . . [under] Articles
58, paragraph 1, and 87, paragraph 1(a) of UNCLOS, and under
customary international law; (2) in boarding, investigating, inspecting,
arresting and detaining the 'Arctic Sunrise' breached its obligations to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by a
flag state as provided by Article 58 and Part VII of UNCLOS, and under
customary international law[.]
Id. para. 33.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
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3. PrescriptionofProvisionalMeasures
On October 21, 2013, the Netherlands filed a request for the
prescription of provisional measures "under article 290 paragraph 5,
of the Convention in a dispute concerning the boarding and detention
of the vessel Arctic Sunrise in the [EEZ] of the Russian Federation
and the detention of the persons on board the vessel by the Russian
Federation." 22 4 Subsequently, the Netherlands asked ITLOS to
prescribe provisional measures, and order Russia to:
[(1)] Enable the 'Arctic Sunrise' to be resupplied, to leave its place
of detention and the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the
Russian Federation and to exercise the freedom of navigation; [(2)]
Immediately release the crew members of the 'Arctic Sunrise', and
allow them to leave the territory and maritime areas under the
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. . 225
On October 22, 2013, the Russian Federation brought to the
attention of the tribunal that:
Upon ratification of the Convention on 2 6th February 1997 the
Russian Federation made a statement, according to which, inter
alia, 'it does not accept procedures provided for in section 2 of Part
XV of the Convention, entailing binding decisions with respect to
disputes ... concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the
exercise of the sovereign rights of jurisdiction.' 226

224. Id. para. 1.
225. Id. para. 34. The additional provisional measures requested by the
Netherlands included the following:
"[(3)] Suspend all judicial and administrative proceedings, and refrain
from initiating any further proceedings, in connection with the incidents
leading to the boarding and detention of the 'Arctic Sunrise', and refrain
from taking or enforcing any judicial or administrative measures against
the 'Arctic Sunrise', its crew members, its owners and its operators; and
[(4)] Ensure that no other action is taken which might aggravate or extend
the dispute . . .

Id. para. 64.
226. Id. para. 9.
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On this basis, Russia notified the Netherlands that it did not intend to
participate in the proceedings before ITLOS.2 2 7
On November 6, 2013, despite Russia's absence from the
proceedings, the Tribunal heard oral statements from the
Netherlands. 228 After considering the case holistically, ITLOS found
that as a matter of international law "the absence of a party or failure
of a party to defend its case does not constitute a bar to the
proceedings and does not preclude the tribunal from prescribing
provisional measures." 229 Given the contentions of the parties, the
Tribunal found that the substantive dispute involved "a difference of
opinions . .. as to the applicability of the provisions of the Convention

as to the rights and obligations of a flag State and a coastal State."2 30
By a vote of nineteen to two, 2 31 the Tribunal then prescribed the
following provisional measures:
The Russian Federation shall immediately release the vessel Arctic
Sunrise and all persons who have been detained, upon the posting
of a bond or other financial security . .. in the amount of 3,600,000

euros ... Upon the posting of a bond or other financial security ...
the Russian Federation shall ensure that the vessel Arctic Sunrise
and all persons who have been detained are allowed to leave the

227. Id.
228. Id. para. 27. Ms. Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Legal Adviser of Foreign Affairs,
appeared as Agent on behalf of the Netherlands. Id.
229. Id. para. 48.
230. Id. para. 68. Although not relevant to the discussion, the analysis the
Tribunal undertook in establishing jurisdiction is quite elegant. ITLOS decreed that
the articles of the Convention invoked by the Netherlands formed "a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal might be founded ... [and] that the Annex
VII arbitral tribunal would primafacie have jurisdiction over the dispute." Id. paras.
70-71. Reading Article 290(1) and 290(5) together, ITLOS concluded the subject
matter on which the Netherlands sought relief (the Convention provisions),
necessitated the prescription of provisional measures. Id. para. 105. The Tribunal
possessed the power to determine the necessity of prescribing provisional measures
under UNCLOS Article 290(5) because Article 290(1) provides in pertinent part that
if "any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within
two weeks from the date of the request for provisional measures, [ITLOS] ... may
prescribe provisional measures . . . if it considers . . . the situation so requires." Id.

paras. 78-79.
231. Id. para. 105.
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territory and maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation. 232
In ordering the release of "all persons who have been detained,"
ITLOS made international judicial history. Subject to the limited
scenarios where a State has or is violating jus cogens233 norms or a
multi-lateral agreement,234 it does not appear that an international
tribunal has ever ordered the release of a State's national being held
intrastate and prosecuted under that State's domestic laws.2 3 5
4. Dissent and Separate Opinion: Highlightingthe Conflict
The majority's extension of Article 18 is articulated implicitly, as
the order to release "all persons who have been detained" 236 includes
Russian nationals. Therefore, the majority does not substantively
defend its application of Article 18 nor even acknowledge the
unorthodox nature of its order. The separate opinion of Judge Jesus,
and the critical dissent of Judge Golitsyn, highlight the magnitude of
ITLOS' decision. 237 Interestingly, beyond noting the lack of legal
foundation for the majority's decision, Judges Jesus and Golitsyn
failed to discuss the specific faults in the majority order and submitted
their opinions in a relatively undeveloped state.2 38 Perhaps further
discussion was not given because the Tribunal's implicit decree
appeared so explicitly erroneous.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. See infra Part V.A., regarding an international tribunal's ability to compel
the release of nationals based on the violation ofjus cogens norms.
234. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the availability for redress under the
European Convention on Human Rights).
235. Excluding the Arctic Sunrise case, no ITLOS decision to date has ordered
a State to release one of its own citizens who is being prosecuted under the national
ITLOS.ORG,
See
List
of
Cases,
laws
of
that
State.
https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=94 (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
236. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 105.
237. See generally Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, separate opinion of Judge
Jesus; see also id., dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn. Judge Kulyk also
dissented, however, his rationale did not turn on the Tribunal's implicit order to
release the Russian detainees. See id. para. 15.
238. See generally Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, separate opinion of Judge
Jesus; id., dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

39

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

2014]

GONE OVERBOARD

147

Despite joining the majority, Judge Jesus wrote separately to note
the impropriety of extending Article 18 to the Russian
crewmembers. 2 3 9 He began by stating the implicit effect of the
majority's order in that "[t]he decision of the Tribunal ordering the
Russian Federation to release all the detained persons includes
members of the personnel of Russian citizenship." 240 He then concurs
with the customary understanding of diplomatic protection, as
codified by the ILC in Article 18 and complied with by the Tribunal in
earlier decisions. 2 4 1
After explaining the universal understanding and application of
diplomatic protection when considered in the ship-as-unit context,
Judge Jesus contrasts the unnerving approach the majority took,
stating that he does "not think . .. that the concept should interfere

with the special legal relationship that exists between a State and its
citizens in its own territory." 242 Importantly, Judge Jesus then
decisively frames the quandary declared by the Tribunal stating:
To order a State to release its own citizens who are being
prosecuted in its domestic courts for alleged violations of that
State's own law may be pushing too far the scope of the
applicability of the ship-as-a-unit concept. . . I would have
preferred that the order of release applies to all personnel and not to
the Russian citizens. 243
Judge Golitsyn, a Russian himself,24 4 was stronger in his
contentions. In his dissent he noted the core error in the majority's
decision: an international tribunal has no authority under international
law to compel the release of a State's nationals prosecuted under
domestic law. 245 Finding the majority's order at odds with the
239. See id., separate opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 18.
240. Id.
241. See id. at paras. 18-20. See supra note 183, for Judge Jesus' full
comments on the matter.
242. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, separate opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 19.
243. Id. para. 20.
244. See generally President Vladimir Vladirmirovich Golitsyn, ITLOS.ORG,
https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=94 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (providing
background information on President Vladimir Vladimirovich Golitsyn).
245. See Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn,
paras. 46-47.
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international legal regime that empowers it, Judge Golitsyn submitted
that "[w]hat is utterly incomprehensible .. . is how the Tribunal can
prescribe a provisional measure calling for all detained persons to be
allowed to leave the territory under the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation, including, and this is the most astounding, the Russian
nationals among them." 246 Judge Golitsyn concluded that "[t]he
Tribunal cannot claim under the circumstances that it preserves the
rights of the Russian Federation by prescribing the release of the ship
and its crew upon the posting of a bond or other financial security." 247
What the majority ordered implicitly, Judges Jesus and Golitsyn
criticized explicitly. While they declined to include their full
rationale, their comments demonstrate that the Tribunal's decision
cannot coexist with the most fundamental underpinnings of public
international law.
B. Arctic Sunrise and the Conflict with Russia'sRights under
InternationalLaw
Where the indictment of foreign citizens under Russian law may
very well trigger questions of international law, the indictment of
Russian citizens under its national law is within the sole adjudicative
discretion of Russia. This is because international law is a system of
laws between States, where national law is a system of laws within a
State, "regulating the relations of its citizens with each other and with
that [S]tate." 2 48 "Neither legal order has the power to create or alter
rules of the other." 24 9 In accordance with international law, Russia
possesses the affirmative right to hold its citizens accountable under
national law for acts committed extraterritorially because: (1)
UNCLOS Article 60 provides Russia exclusive enforcement
jurisdiction in its EEZ, and (2) Russia may invoke a sovereign
jurisdictional right over its citizens through the active nationality
principle.

246. Id.
247. Id.
248. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 49.

249. Id.
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1. Russia's Enforcement JurisdictionRegarding Installations
in the EEZ
a. Enforcement Jurisdictionin InternationalCriminalLaw
Generally, enforcement jurisdiction in a State's own territory is
uncontroversial where "the unilateral and extra-territorial use of
enforcement jurisdiction is impermissible." 250 "[Jurisdiction] cannot
be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a
permissive rule derived from international law or a convention."251 A
State's consent to extraterritorial enforcement action may be given on
an ad hoc basis, or standing orders for enforcement action may take
the form of bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements. 25 2
As a States Party to UNCLOS, 2 53 Russia possesses exclusive
criminal enforcement jurisdiction under Article 60 of the Convention
with regard to artificial islands, installations, and structures in its
EEZ.25 4 Under UNCLOS, ITLOS was "established to adjudicate
disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the
Convention,"255 not the application of a State's domestic criminal law
with regard to its own citizens. Assuming Russian criminal law
extends to the Prirallomnaya fixed oil platform, ITLOS possesses
neither the legal competence nor jurisdiction to question the
culpability of a Russian citizen, charged with a Russian crime, in a
Russian court, and detained in a Russian prison.

250. Id. at 478.
251. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. 25 (ser. A) No. 9/10, at p. 18-19
(Sept. 7), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07
lotus.htm.
252. See BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 480.
253. The Russian Federation ratified UNCLOS on March 12, 1997.
Chronological Lists of Ratification, UJN.ORG, http://www.un.org/depts/los/
referencefiles/chronological-listsof ratifications.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
254. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60; 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra
note 99, at 585.
255. ITLOS Website, supra note 44.
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b. The Exclusive Economic Zone Relating to UNCLOS Article 60
The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 256 in
which the rights of the coastal State, Russia, are superior to all others
as it relates to economic exploitation and exploration. 257 UNCLOS
Article 57 limits the EEZ to 200 nautical miles, 258 measured from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 259
Specifically, Russia has jurisdiction over the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations, and structures, created under Article 60
of the Convention. 260 The coastal State must give due regard to the
rights and obligations of other States when it exercises its EEZ
rights.2 6 1
The status of the EEZ, and the sovereignty the coastal State
possesses in it, has' been a subject of discussion since the zone's
inception. 262 The EEZ is, by its very nature, a discretionary zone that
must be proclaimed to the world.263 The general consensus is that the
EEZ is a sui generis area representing neither a part of the high seas
nor part of the territorial sea. 264 Defining the status of the zone
naturally defines the classification of rights of coastal and flag States
within it.
Despite the continuing adjudication of rights and
enumeration of powers to States in the EEZ, the Convention is clear
on the jurisdictional rights of coastal States relating to artificial
islands, installations, and structures in the EEZ. 265

256. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 55.
257. Id. art. 56, para. 1, sec. a.
258. The extent of sovereignty afforded the coastal State in the EEZ has been a
constant source of a debate. See generally Jonathon I. Carney, The Exclusive
Economic Zone and Public International Law, in LAW OF THE SEA 159, 159-60
(Donald R. Rothwell ed. 2013).
259. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 57.
260. Id. art. 56, para. 1, sec. b(i). See generally id. art. 60.
261. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 56, para. 2. The origin of the zone may be
linked to the practice of Latin American States after World War II, "when Chile,
Peru, and Ecuador claimed. . . [200 nautical miles] for the exercise of full
sovereignty." 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 99, at 585.
262.

See generally GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 62-64.

263. Id. at 65.
264. Id. at 66.
265. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60.
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c. Russia'sExclusive CriminalEnforcement Jurisdictionunder
UNCLOS Article 60
UNCLOS Article 60266 provides the coastal State, in this case
Russia, the exclusive right to construct, authorize, and regulate the
construction and operation of artificial islands, installations, and
structures in the EEZ.26 7 The coastal State also possesses exclusive
jurisdiction as it relates to these islands, installations, and structures in
matters of customs, fiscal, health, safety, and immigration laws and
regulations. 268 "This exclusive jurisdiction also includes criminal
jurisdiction with regard to offenses committed on or against such
artificial islands, installations and structures." 269 Notice must be
given in conjunction with construction under Article 60 as well as
permanent means for warning of the presence of an object
manufactured by the coastal State. 270

266. Interestingly, the USSR submitted Draft Articles at the 1971 session of
the Sea-Bed Committee, which addressed the construction of "stationary and mobile
installations." 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 99, at 574. The proposal
"addressed the establishment of safety zones around such structures, to avoid
interference with and ensure the safety of international navigation." Id.
267. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 1. "At UNCLOS I (1958), the issue
of artificial islands, installations and structures was addressed in the context of the
continental shelf." 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 99, at 573.
268. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 2; see 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY,
supra note 99, at 585 (UNCLOS Article 60(2) pertaining to customs, fiscal, health,
safety, and immigration laws and regulations "follows [UNCLOS] [A]rticle 21,
paragraph 2(h), which allows the coastal State to adopt laws and regulations in
respect of such matters in the territorial sea, and article 33 regarding the contiguous
zone.").
269. 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 99, at 585; see generally
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, adopted March 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 27 I.L.M. 668. The
Convention was entered into force March 1, 1992. Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Again Maritime Navigation, IMO, http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx (last visited Nov.
28, 2014) (addressing criminal enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ).
270. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 3; see George K. Walker & John E.
Noyes, Definitions for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention-Part II, 33 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 191, 226 (2003) ("UNCLOS also provides for signals 'warning' of
various dangers. Article 60(3) inter alia requires coastal states declaring an EEZ to
give '[d]ue notice... of the construction of such artificial islands, installations or
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Therefore, UNCLOS provides Russia the right to enforce its rights
under international law through the enactment of domestic law.
Consistent with this right, the Russian State Duma has extended the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to the Russian EEZ.2 7 1
Article 11(2) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation states
that "[t]he validity of this Code shall also be extended to offences
committed on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic
zone of the Russian Federation."272 Article 213 of the Criminal Code
of the Russian Federation provides for "hooliganism," the crime under
which Russian investigators indicted the "Arctic 30.",273
"[H]ooliganism," as defined in the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, appears to be a logical charge as it involves "a gross
violation of the public order which expresses patent contempt for
society, attended by violence against private persons or by the threat
of its use, and likewise by the destruction or damage of other people's
property."274 Additionally, the State Duma has also codified the
"Russian Federation Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the
Russian Federation" in furthering its Article 60 rights.2 7 5
Installations and structures under UNCLOS Article 60 include
human-made objects such as oil drilling rigs, navigational towers, and
off-shore docking and oil pumping facilities. 276 This brings the
Prirallomnaya fixed oil platform, located wholly within Russia's
EEZ,2 77 squarely within the Article's definitional scope.2 78 Although
structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be
maintained."').
271. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] (Criminal Code]
art. 11, para. 2 (Russ.).
272. Id.
273. Id. art. 213.
274. Id.
275. See RUSSIAN FEDERATION: LEGISLATION, Federal Act on the exclusive

economic zone of the Russian Federation, 2 December 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_199
8_ActEZ.pdf (discussing the implementation of internationally founded
enforcement rights under domestic law and in accordance with the Russian
Constitution).
276. 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY, supra note 99, at 578.

277. See supra Part IV.A.2.
278. EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at 71 ("Artificial Islands,

installations and structures . .. do not possess the status of islands, and may not be
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installations and structures do not possess the status of islands, 279 the
coastal State may, as necessary, establish reasonable safety zones
around these structures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of
the structures. 2 80 It is within the discretion of the coastal State to
decide the breadth of the safety zones around structures in its EEZ, but
such breadth "shall not exceed a distance of 500 met[ers] around
them, measured from each point on their outer edge." 281 The
Convention mandates that all ships must 282 "respect these safety zones
and shall comply with the generally accepted international standards
regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands." 283
It is uncontestable that, consistent with its international treaty
rights under UNCLOS, Russia had the exclusive right to enact and
enforce Russian domestic criminal law with regard to the
Prirallomnaya fixed oil platform. Consequently, Russian criminal
law applied to all crewmembers of the Arctic Sunrise and, most
undoubtedly, to those possessing Russian nationality. While the
balance of rights in the EEZ will continue to be debated, the
enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State in situations relating to the
interference of a structure or installation created in accordance with
UNCLOS Article 60 is not a contested issue. 284 ITLOS' application
used to establish baselines, enclose internal waters, or establish or measure the
breadth of the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf.").
279. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 8.
280. Id. art. 60, para. 4. See EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 61, at
71 (noting that safety zones may be established not only for the safety of the
structures but also for "the safety of navigation in their vicinity").
281. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 5.
282. At the second session of the Conference (1974), the United States of
America proposed Articles on installations in the EEZ, "stat[ing] in imperative terms
that ships 'must' respect established safety zones." 2 UNCLOS COMMENTARY,
supra note 99, at 577-78. That language was picked up in subsequent proposals. Id.
283. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 6.
284. Tanaka submits that "it is clear that the coastal State has exclusive . . .
enforcement jurisdiction, over installations and structures . . . under Article 60."
TANAKA, supra note 135, at 129. It is also seems clear that enforcement does not
extend under Article 60, pertaining to artificial structures in the EEZ, for noneconomic purposes. Id. The most favored view seems to be that a right not
explicitly afforded the coastal State in UNCLOS, falls into the scope of Article 59.
Id. UNCLOS Article 59 is a fallback provision for the resolution of conflicts
between the coastal State and other States in the EEZ, where the Convention does
not provide an exclusive right. See UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 59.
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of the ship-as-a-unit concept codified in Article 18 is incompatible
with Russia's rights under Article 60 and is not a representation of
customary international law. The Tribunal's order forces the ILC to
crystallize the distinction between the customary norms it endorsed
under Draft Article 18 and the unprecedented and unsubstantiated
approach employed by the Arctic Sunrise court.
2. The Conflict between the Arctic Sunrise Case and Nationality
Jurisdiction
As incompatible as ITLOS' application of Article 18 is with
Russia's right to hold its nationals accountable under Article 60, the
Tribunal's order is even more irreconcilable with the nationality
principle. ITLOS' order meddles in Russia's application of its
criminal code with regard to its nationals. It is undeniable that ITLOS
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a sovereign State's application
of its criminal law when the offenders are nationals of the detaining
State. ITLOS' conduct is inapposite to the bedrock principle of
nationality jurisdiction and necessitates an affirmative exception to the
application of Article 18 in the Arctic Sunrise context.
The nationality principle invokes personal jurisdiction based on
the connection between the State and its nationals and represents one
of "[t]he two undisputed bases on which State jurisdiction is
founded." 285 The concept of nationality is perhaps the oldest legal
link recognized by international law. 2 86 All States in one form or
another apply nationality jurisdiction because it is a representation of
sovereignty over nationals and the ability to retain sovereign order
throughout the world.2 8 7 Criminal jurisdiction based on this principal,
where the perpetrator is a national of the perpetrating State, is referred
285. Ahlstr6m and others v. Commission (In re Wood Pulp Cartel), joint cases
89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-17/85 and 125-9/85, 96 I.L.R. 148 et seq. (1994); see
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (6th ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2008) [hereinafter SHAW].
286. GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 13; see SHAW, supra note 285, at 659
("Since every state possesses sovereignty and jurisdictional powers and since every
state must consist of a collection of individual human beings, it is essential that a
link between the two be legally established.").
287. Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v.
Martinelli: ExtraterritorialJurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REv. 1, 18 (2007) [hereinafter Blakesley & Stigall].
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to as the active nationality principle. 288 In the Arctic Sunrise context,
the perpetrators are Russian nationals.
a. EstablishingNationality
Before a State can employ the active nationality principle it must
establish that the offender holds the nationality of that State. 289 But,
the nationality of the Russian crewmembers was not at issue in the
Arctic Sunrise case.2 90 The ICJ defined nationality in the Nottebohm
case as "a legal bond having in its basis a social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties." 29 1 Nationality
jurisdiction is analogous to that of territorial sovereignty as it involves
the assignment of persons to States. 292 Most importantly, it is
generally accepted as a pillar of international law that States possess
freedom of action in matters of nationality. 29 3
"It is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the
rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that
nationality by naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance
with that legislation." 294 Nationality has traditionally been conferred
based on two principles: descent from a national, ius sanguinis; and
288. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 451 (2d ed. 2005).
289. See id.
290. See supra Part IV.A.2.
291. Nottebohm, supra note 141, at 23.
292. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 510.
293. Id. at 509.
294. Nottebohm, supra note 141, at 4; see also Eur. Consult. Ass., European
Convention on Nationality, art. 3, E.T.S. No. 166 (1997) ("Each State shall
determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be accepted by
other States in so far as it is consistent with applicable international conventions,
customary international law and principles of law generally recognised with regard
to nationality."); BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 511. This notion, generally accepted
by international law, is often disputed when the terms upon which nationality is
granted conflicts with and affects another State. See Nationality Decrees Issued in
Tunis and Morocco (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4,
at 24 (Feb. 7) ("[W]hether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction
of a state is an essentially relative question . .. depend[ing] upon the development of
international relations . . . [I]n the present state of international law, questions of

nationality are, in the opinion of this court, in principle within this reserved
domain.").
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birth in a State territory, ius soli.295 Once a State bestows nationality
upon a person, "the individual upon whom ... [nationality] is
conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the
authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of
the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State." 29 6
b. The Active NationalityPrinciple: Theory andApplication
1. Theory
Both civil and common law countries employ the active
nationality principle in attaching jurisdiction to a crime committed by
a national abroad.29 7 The jurisdictional right of a State to prosecute its
nationals solely on the basis of nationality is grounded in the
allegiance owed to one's nation under domestic law. 29 8 Traditionally,
States have invoked the active nationality principle to protect State
interests abroad (treason is the most prevalent example).29 9 More
recently, however, States have employed nationality jurisdiction in
situations that do not directly endanger State interests. 300
Civil law nations, such as the Russian Federation, apply the active
nationality principle rather liberally, 30 1 where common law nations
confine the application of the principle to serious offenses or when

295. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 511. Interestingly, persons born on a vessel
or aircraft are generally awarded citizenship of the State of registration. Id.
296. Nottebohm, supra note 141, at 4.
297.

ILIAS BANTEKAS, SUSAN NASH & MARK MACKEREL, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW 23 (Cavendish Publishing 2001) [hereinafter

INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW].

298. Id.; see Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 519 (Supp. July 1935); Blakesley &
Stigall, supra note 287, at 19 ("[N]ationals have the benefit and protection of their
state, owe allegiance for this protection, and thus should be answerable to national
jurisdiction for any offense they commit.").
299.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 297, at 23.

300. Id.
301. Id.; see Public Prosecutor v. Antoni, 32 I.L.R. 140 (1960), in 32
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 140-47 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1966) (The Swedish

Supreme Court found that Swedish nationals were bound by the Swedish traffic
code while abroad.).
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imposing a double criminality requirement. 302 The justification for
expansive application may be found in civil law nations' general
refusal to extradite their nationals. 303 This is to say that civil law
nations are forced to invoke the active nationality principle in
prosecuting their nationals for crimes committed abroad because they
will not allow extradition. 304 Inversely, "the state does not need to
extradite its citizens because it can prosecute them itself."30 5 There is
also the general fear that if prosecution is not invoked through the
nationality principle for an extraterritorial offense, the perpetrator may
very well go unpunished.306
This theory of intrastate prosecution is a motivating factor in
Russia's broad treatment of the active nationality principle as it
disallows the extradition of its nationals under the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation 30 7 as well as Chapter 2 of the Russian
Constitution. 30 8 Although extradition is part of Russia's theoretical
302. Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsminy, The Nationality of the Offender and the
Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminalCourt, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 606, 609 (2001)
[hereinafter Deen-Racsminy]. On a more theoretical basis, Europeans assert that an
offense committed abroad by a national actually harms the reputation and respect of
the State globally and therefore warrants prosecution by the national's home state.
Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 287, at 19. In general, even civil law nations
consider nationality jurisdiction secondary to a State that claims jurisdiction based
on the territoriality principle. Id.
303.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 297, at 23; see Deen-

Racsminy, supra note 302, at 609 ("While the principle is most frequently justified
on grounds of the allegiance owed by a person to his state of nationality and state
sovereignty, a more pragmatic reason is that many countries-mainly those with a
civil-law tradition-generally do not extradite their own nationals."). Civil law
nations draw their heritage in disallowing the extradition of their own citizens from
antiquity, namely the city-states of Greece and Rome. Blakesley & Stigall, supra
note 287, at 19.
304. Michael Plachta, (Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?,
13 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 77, 119 (1999) [hereinafter Plachta] (noting the correlative
nature of non-extradition States and the active nationality principle).
305. Id.
306. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 287, at 19.
307.

UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RossIisKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code]

art. 13 (Russ.) ("Citizens of the Russian Federation who have committed crimes in
foreign states shall not be subject to extradition to these states.").
308.

KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.

61 (Russ.) ("A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deported from Russia or
extradited to another State.").
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basis for invoking the active nationality principle, Russia is not
precluded from applying its criminal code in non-extradition contexts
such as the Arctic Sunrise case.

2. Application
Naturally, the award of a State's nationality to an individual
confers both rights as well as obligations. 309 Nationals are entitled to
a number of rights, depending on the nation, such as the right to vote
and a valid passport enabling the individual the ability to travel
abroad.3 1 0 Chapter 2 of the Russian Constitution provides for the
"Rights and Freedoms of Man and Citizen" and confers several
fundamental rights upon Russian nationals. 3 1 1 Article 26(1) of this
Chapter notes that "[e]veryone shall have the right to determine and
indicate his nationality. No one may be forced to determine and
indicate his or her nationality." 3 12 Under Article 27(1), persons who
"legally stay[] in the territory of the Russian Federation shall have the
right to free travel, choice of place of stay or residence." 313
Additionally, a Russian national may legally hold dual nationality;
however, "the possession of a foreign citizenship ... shall not
derogate his rights and freedoms and shall not free him from the
obligations stipulated by . .. Russian citizenship." 3 14
Concomitantly, nationals of a State also avail themselves to the
Many countries "claim
criminal jurisdiction of that State. 3 15
jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals" regardless of
whether the offense was committed extraterritorially. 3 16 Russia
309. GAVOUNELI, supra note 89, at 14. In Nottebohm, the ICJ crystallized this
concept, noting that "[n]ationality serves above all to determine that the person upon
whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law
of the State in question grants or imposes on its nationals." Nottebohm, supra note
141, at 4.
310. SHAW, supra note 285, at 659.
RF]
FEDERATSIT
[KONST.
KONSTITUTSI1A
ROSSIISKOI
311. See
[CONSTITUTION] arts. 17-64 (Russ.).

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. art. 26, para. 1.
Id. art. 27, para. 1.
Id. art. 62, para. 1.
See SHAW, supra note 285, at 663.
Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

51

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4

GONE OVERBOARD

2014]

159

subscribes to this application of the active nationality principle-the
principle is codified in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
under Articles 11 and 12."' Article 11(2) states "[t]he validity of this
[Criminal] Code shall . . . be extended to offences committed on the
continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian
Federation." 318 Article 12 broadly extends the applicability of
Russian criminal law to its nationals, stating "[c]itizens of the Russian
Federation ... who have committed crimes outside the boundaries of
the Russian Federation shall be brought to criminal responsibility
under this Code." 319
ITLOS' order for Russia to release its nationals breaches Russia's
conclusive right to invoke the active nationality principle and
demands the ILC except the Tribunal's application of Article 18 from
the customary norms it affirmatively endorsed in the Draft Articles.
Russia's right to nationality jurisdiction is unaffected by ITLOS, as
Russia has extended its Criminal Code to the EEZ and competently
charged its nationals with hooliganism, a crime provided in that Code.
ITLOS possesses no jurisdiction under UNCLOS to evaluate the
propriety of a sovereign nation, like Russia, indicting its own citizens
under Russian criminal law.

V. RUSSIA'S OBLIGATIONS TO ITS NATIONALS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Despite the overwhelming reasons grounded in well-established
international law and public policy for disallowing the extension of
the ship-as-a-unit concept to nationals detained by their State of
nationality, two unlikely but hypothetically plausible scenarios exist in
which an international tribunal could compel release. These scenarios
include: (1) if the State, in detaining its nationals, is violating a jus
cogens norm; or (2) if the detaining State is a member of the European
Convention on Human Rights and is violating an enumerated right
under the Convention, for which release would be appropriate. The
two scenarios are inapplicable in the Arctic Sunrise context and

317. UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code]
arts. 11-12 (Russ.).
318. Id. art. 11, para. 2.

319. Id. art. 12.
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ITLOS would not be competent to adjudicate the claims given its
jurisdictional limitations.
A. Jus Cogens Norms
One conceivable and unlikely instance in which an international
tribunal could compel a sovereign State to release its own citizens
who are charged and detained under national law would be if, in doing
so, the State's actions or its national law 320 violated a jus cogens
norm. As noted by one scholar, "[a] jus cogens norm is a peremptory
rule of international law that prevails over any conflicting rule or
agreement." 32 1 As such, all States are obligated erga omnes to abstain
from the commission of ajus cogens norm "towards the international
community as a whole" 322 including all States as well as to its own
nationals. 323 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
320. In addition to the requirement that a national law may not conflict with a
peremptory norm as discussed supra, a State's internal law may not negate its treaty
obligations. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 [hereinafter VCLT] ("A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
321. Pamela J. Stephens, A CategoricalApproach to Human Rights Claims:
Jus Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement, 22 WiS. INT'L L.J. 245, 245 (2004);
VCLT, supra note 320, art. 53.
322. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Second Phase) (Beig. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
323. See State Responsibility, supra note 116, art. 48. Under this article:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State . . . if: (a) The obligation breached is owed
to a group of States including that State, and is established for the
protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) The obligation
breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 2. Any State
entitled to invoke responsibility . .. may claim the responsible State: (a)
Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition . . . ; and (b) Performance of the obligation of
reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the interest of the
injured State or the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.
Id. Similarly, as noted in the Barcelona Traction case:
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them
the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment
afforded to them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn
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Treaties addresses the impact of jus cogens norms on treaty
applicability:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law ... a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which derogation is not permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character. 3 2 4
According to the ILC, the most notable examples of jus cogens
norms include "the prohibition of aggression, slavery and the slave
trade, genocide, racial discrimination apartheid, and torture." 325
"[B]asic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict and, right to self-determination" are also considered norms of
a jus cogens nature. 3 26 The ICJ noted in the Barcelona Traction case
that such acts include "acts of aggression. . . genocide [and] the basic

rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and
racial discrimination." 327
Although the international community has had difficulty defining
with great specificity those offenses that garnerjus cogens status, it is
abundantly clear that the detention of Russian nationals in a Russian
prison for interfering with drilling operations in the Russian EEZ is
not tantamount to the violation of a jus cogens norm. Insinuating the
subject matter of the Arctic Sunrise case triggers ajus cogens analysis,
between the obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis-A-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Barcelona Traction, supra note 322, at 33.
324. VCLT, supra note 320, art. 53.
325. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,
sec. 33, July 18, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (2006); see also BROWNLIE, supra note
38, at 596.
326. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,
sec. 33, July 18, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (2006).
327. Barcelona Traction, supra note 322, at 32.
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reserved for crimes such as genocide, would be both ridiculous and
irresponsible. Neither ITLOS, nor any other international tribunal,
could order the release of Russia's nationals under the theory Russia
had violated its obligations to its citizens, erga omnes.
Even if Russia's actions or the application of its national law
implicated a jus cogens norm, the jurisdiction of ITLOS over the
parties is still in question. 328 The ICJ has been clear, however, that
regardless of a State's culpability in violating a jus cogens norm,
jurisdictional requirements must still be met. 329 This is to say that an
international tribunal may not ignore the jurisdictional requirements
needed over the parties solely because the subject matter of the case
involves the alleged violation of ajus cogens norm.
B. The European Convention on Human Rights
Another conceivable scenario where an international tribunal
could compel the release of Russian detainees is if the European Court
of Human Rights ("the Court") conclusively found Russia violated its
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR"). On March 17, 2014, the "Arctic 30" (which included the
three Russian nationals) "applied to the European Court of Human
Rights requesting damages from the Russian Federation, as well as a
declaration that their apprehension and detention was unlawful." 3 3 0
The complaint alleged Russia violated its obligations under Articles 5
and 10 of the ECHR concerning the improper deprivation of liberty
and freedom of expression, respectively. 331
For purposes of the relevant discussion regarding diplomatic
protection, the ECHR claims will be addressed as if they had been
alleged during the Russian nationals' two-month detention. Assuming

328. Russia did not voluntarily consent to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and
it contested ITLOS' compulsory jurisdiction over the case under UNCLOS Article
290. Arctic Sunrise, supra note 24, para. 9.
329. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 596-97.
330. 'Arctic 30' Jailed in Russia to Take Case to European Court,
GREENPEACE.COM (Mar. 17, 2014) http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/en/
press/releases/Arctic-30-jailed-in-Russia-to-take-case-to-European-Courtof-HumanRights/.
331. Id.
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also that Russia did violate the ECHR33 2 with respect to its nationals,
the Dutch invocation of diplomatic protection on their behalf was still
inappropriate.
The atrocities committed in World War II provided the requisite
impetus for the fifteen member states of the Council of Europe to draft
the ECHR.3 3 3 The original parties signed the document in Rome on
November 4, 1950.334 Netherlands ratified the ECHR in 1954335 and
Russia became a member in 1998 following the conclusion of the
Cold War and the Soviet era marking the beginning of a new
Russia.3 3 6 The ECHR is based loosely on the rights acknowledged in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights337 and is bifurcated into
two interrelated sections: (1) the substantive human rights recognized
by contracting parties, and (2) the creation of "a procedural apparatus
of the Commission and the Court for ensuring that those rights are
respected in the member states." 338
Irrespective of the substantive merits of the Russian nationals'
claims under Articles 5 3 and 10340 of the ECHR, the enumerated
332. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. TS No. 5, 213
UNTS 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
333. Scheib, supra note 202, at 103.
334. Id.
335. The Netherlands, ECHR.COE, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CPNetherlandsENG.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
336. The Russian Federation, ECHR.COE.INT, http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/CPRussiaENG.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
337. Scheib, supra note 202, at 104.
338. Id.
339. ECHR, supra note 332, art. 5. Article 5, titled "Right to liberty and
security," states:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person
after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of
a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to
secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; the lawful
arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the
detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
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procedures defined in the ECHR for bringing a claim before the Court
make a flag State's espousal of claims not only premature, but
completely preempted.
Under Article 32 of the ECHR, the
jurisdiction of the Court is naturally limited to "matters concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols." 34'
If the Netherlands had sought to espouse a claim on behalf of the
Russian nationals during their ongoing detention under the ECHR, it
would have been completely preempted by Article 35. Article 35
involves "[a]dmissibility criteria," the first provision of which
mandates the exhaustion of all local remedies: 342 "[t]he Court may
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted,
according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the
prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound
mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or
detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into
the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.
Id.
340. ECHR, supra note 332, art. 10. Article 10, regarding the right to the
"Freedom of Expression," states that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id.
341. Id. art. 32.
342. See infra Part II.B.2., for discussion of diplomatic protection theory and
exhaustion of local remedies. The theory underlying the exhaustion of local
remedies prior to seeking redress at the international level is the same with regard to
diplomatic protection; States should be given an opportunity to redress a wrong in
their domestic courts before a case is allowed to be brought in an international
forum, either by the individual themselves, or by a State on the individual's behalf.
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within a period of six months from the date on which the final
decision was taken." 343 If the claim had been brought any time before
December 29, 2013, the date amnesty was granted,34 4 the Court would
have been forced to deny an application based on Article 35, for
domestic remedies were still available at that time and were ultimately
granted. Therefore, the Court would not have had jurisdiction over
the matter 345 and ITLOS was not competent to adjudicate a third party
claim under the ECHR, as the Tribunal's jurisdiction pertains only to
the interpretation of UNCLOS. 346
Furthermore, it also would have been appropriate for the Court to
deny the espousal of a claim based on Article 34, regarding individual
applications: "The Court may receive applications from any person,
nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties ...
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right." 347 Under traditional diplomatic
protection theory, as well as the ship-as-a-unit concept embodied in
Article 18, a State (like the Netherlands) is permitted to espouse
claims on behalf of a national-or a non-national under Article 18-in
part because most international forums limit standing to States. 34 8
Where traditional diplomatic protection is grounded in the legal
fiction that the State itself is harmed through its nationals' injuries, a
flag State under Article 18 is not harmed by the injury of a nonnational crewmember. 349 Consequently, because the flag State is not
fictionally harmed, and because Article 34 permits an individual to
343. ECHR, supra note 332, art. 35.
344. See supra note 215.
345. Clearly the "Arctic 30" are complying with the jurisdictional
requirements in applying to the Court following the exhaustion of local remedies
and "within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken." ECHR, supra note 332, art. 35. The hypothetical presented is merely to
show that the invocation of Article 18 would have been unsuccessful even if the
Netherlands had espoused claims on behalf of the Russian Nationals before the
European Court of Human Rights.
346. See infra Part II.A.1. (discussing ITLOS jurisdiction).
347. ECHR, supra note 332, art. 34.
348. See e.g., Whitman, supra note 52, at 97-98 (discussing the requirement of
Statehood to litigate before the ICJ).
349. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the preliminary diplomatic protection
criteria).
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bring a claim on his or her own behalf, the Court should not entertain
a claim diplomatically espoused on the individual's behalf before the
individual attempts to do so. 350
VI. CONCLUSION
"Deserve's got nothin' to do with it." 35 1 Will Munny's timeless
words resonate when considering Russian nationals' claims to Dutch
diplomatic protection in the Arctic Sunrise case. The ship-as-a-unit
concept as applied in the diplomatic protection context allows flag
States to espouse claims on behalf of the crewmembers of a vessel
flying its flag, regardless of their nationality. It is a strained fiction
yet customarily accepted function of international law embodied in
Article 18 of the ILC's Draft Article's on Diplomatic Protection. Why
should it be extended further especially in a context that violates the
rights of a sovereign nation?

350. If the State allegedly committing the wrong denied the detained
individual the ability to bring a claim under Article 34, then another contracting
State would be permitted to espouse a claim on the individual's behalf under Article
33 ("[i]nterstate cases"). ECHR, supra note 332, art. 34. This is because the
detaining State would have violated its obligation under Article 34 to not "hinder in
any way the effective exercise of th[e] right" of an individual to bring a claim on his
or her own behalf. Id. Article 33 states: "Any High Contracting Party may refer to
the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols
thereto by another High Contracting Party." Id. art. 33. If, following this unlikely
scenario, a favorable judgment were rendered on behalf of the detained nationals,
Russia could respond in one of four ways:
First, a state may take substantive action to comply with the language and
spirit of the Convention and the judgment ... Second, it may take action
to comply with the language of the Convention only ... Third, the state
may simply ignore the judgment or award of just satisfaction and take no
action to comply with the Court's decision . .. Finally, a state may act
drastically by withdrawing from the optional provisions of the
Convention, the entire Convention or the Council.
Scheib, supra note 202, at 108-09.
351. UNFORGIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992). In Unforgiven Clint Eastwood plays
the character of Will "Bill" Munny, an ex-outlaw who agrees to come out of
retirement for one last assassin job. See id. Munny uttered the iconic quote,
"Deserve's got nothin' to do with it" prior to shooting the crooked local sheriff,
Little Bill, played by Gene Hackman. See id. Munny embodies a character who
struggles with his own humanity, to the extent that he ultimately dismisses morality
all together, and sees little difference between life and death. See id.
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On November 22, 2013, ITLOS prescribed provisional measures
in the Arctic Sunrise case when it recognized claims espoused by the
Netherlands on behalf of three Russian nationals. The order, which
Russia refused to recognize, commanded the Russian Federation to
release the detained Russians, despite their status as Russian nationals
who were detained in a Russian Prison and charged under Russian
national law. The order upsets some of the most foundational
components of international law, namely, a sovereign State's right to
hold its citizens accountable for crimes committed extraterritorially.
The Tribunal's order violates Russia's jurisdictional rights under
international law in two regards: (1) As a States Party to UNCLOS,
Russia possesses exclusive criminal enforcement jurisdiction for
crimes committed on installations or structures in its EEZ, and (2) the
active nationality principle entitles Russia to prosecute its nationals
under national law, regardless of where the crime was committed.
Furthermore, as discussed, the two conceivable scenarios where
the Netherlands may have competently espoused claims on behalf of
the Russian nationals are ultimately inapplicable. First, the detention
carried out by the Russian Federation can in no way be likened with
the traditional understanding of jus cogens norms owed erga omnes.
Second, the Netherlands could not rightfully advocate on behalf of the
Russian nationals before the ECHR. Jurisdiction in that context
would be preempted by the Russian nationals' failure to exhaust local
remedies under Article 35 of the Convention and subsequent ability to
bring claims as individuals under Article 34. Furthermore, ITLOS
lacks the jurisdictional competency to adjudicate such claims given its
exclusive mandate to interpret UNCLOS.
ITLOS' directive creates a rift in the customary understanding of
the ship-as-a-unit concept as applied in diplomatic protection
scenarios: no international tribunal has ever permitted a flag State to
espouse a claim on behalf of a non-national crewmember when that
non-national is detained by his or her State of nationality. If the Draft
Articles on Diplomatic Protection are intended to be the blueprint for
an internationally accepted convention, the ILC must crystallize the
correct application of Article 18 by creating an exception for cases
analogous to the Arctic Sunrise.
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